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ABSTRACT
The United States Corps of Engineers is experimenting with
methods of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in order to
better manage conflicts with those involved in its projects,
procurement, and regulatory decisions. This report, initiated by
Corps personnel, analyzes historical and prospective use of ADR
in contract claims, environmental regulatory decisionmaking, and
civil works projects. Interviews were conducted with key Corps
personnel and others who are knowledgeable about the Corps ADR
initiative to assess the opportunities for, and barriers to,
greater use of ADR by the agency. The results of this research
indicate that the Corps is poised for greater use of ADR in a
variety of contexts. Barriers to ADR are smaller than expected.
Recommendations are offered to assist the Corps in determining
the next steps in its ADR initiative.
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I. RESEARCH STRATEGIES AND ASSUMPTIONS
INTRODUCTION
The United States Corps of Engineers ("the Corps"), a large
federal agency, maintains a diverse array of important missions
including water resource provision, environmental regulation and
military project construction. The Corps issues some 14,000
regulatory permits annually, enters into thousands of contractual
agreements each year, and is engaged in hundreds of military and
civil works projects at any given time. In the course of
fulfilling its missions, the Corps encounters disagreements with
many interest groups and individuals, including: its contractors;
the regulated community; local government sponsors of civil works
projects; other government agencies with overlapping missions;
and environmental advocates.
Conflict is, of course, a fact of life for government
agencies. Members of the public, the regulated community, and
other government bureaus commonly disagree with the way that an
agency conducts its business. In recent years, several federal
agencies have examined their methods of resolving disputes, in an
effort to improve. The Corps, in particular, is striving to
better manage its conflicts. The organization is responding to
pressures for reform, both internal and external. The Chief
Counsel for the Corps and his staff seek to reduce the costs
associated with the conventional methods of dispute resolution.
They are especially concerned with the expense of litigation;
both in financial resources and in the increased burden on
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management. External critics of the Corps say that the agency
does not respond well to conflict. They complain that the Corps
is ill-equipped to settle many important disputes. For example,
companies that do business with the Corps complain that when a
contract problem arises, the disagreement moves too quickly into
the judicialized contract appeals system where resolution can be
delayed for years.
These criticisms are not focused exclusively on the Corps of
Engineers. Indeed, government contractors, the regulated
community and environmentalists complain that various federal
agencies do not respond adequately to their concerns. Several
agencies, ranging from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to the Federal Maritime Commission, are actively experimenting
with various forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in
efforts to improve management of conflicts and better address
critics' concerns. The Corps of Engineers is one of the leaders
in this trend. In particular, the Corps is experimenting with:
minitrials and nonbinding arbitration to resolve disagreement
with private contractors; regulatory permits based on the
consensus recommendations of developers, environmentalists and
interested agencies; and, various forms of ADR for handling
conflicts with local governmental sponsors of water resources
projects.
This report analyses the opportunities and barriers to
greater use of alternative dispute resolution in the Corps of
Engineers. Some of the conclusions may be applicable to other
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public agencies. However, the applicability may be limited by
the distinctive characteristics of the Corps.
The Corps of Engineers is unique among federal agencies in
its history, mission and organization. These distinctions help
explain the obstacles as well as the special opportunities for
change in the Corps' methods of handling conflict. The Corps has
been in existence for over two hundred years. The agency traces
its origins to the Continental Army. Official status was granted
in 1802 when President Jefferson signed the Congressional bill
formally establishing the Corps of Engineers. The organization
was devoted exclusively to military projects until 1824 when a
federal civil works Board of Internal Improvements was created to
plan a national land and water transportation system. President
Monroe appointed a majority of army engineers to the board. This
national transportation board evolved into today's Directorate of
Civil Works.
The agency has sought to preserve its sense of history.
There is a better institutional memory here than in most other,
younger, federal agencies. The archival office employs several
full time historians. A long history and the absence of major
scandals over the years is a source of pride to many of the
Corps' personnel. (1) Pride, and the desire to maintain its
self-image of good engineering and political integrity may make
the agency more sensitive to critics of its work and
decisionmaking style. Moreover, the Congressional funding
mechanism makes the agency especially concerned with elected
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federal representatives' attitudes towards the agency. These
factors of self-image and dependency on Congressional funding for
each project may make the Corps particularly responsive to
criticism. On the other hand, the Corps' longevity may lend a
conservative bent to its style. These countervailing forces of
responsiveness and conservatism may result in a resistance to
dramatic changes, but also lead to a greater inclination to
accommodate critics through reform (Mazmanian, 1979).
The Corps of Engineers has broad, practical missions. The
list of Corps responsibilities is extensive. It constructs air
force bases, federal hospitals, and housing for military
families. In its civil works mission, it builds and operates
dams, channels and levees for flood control, and as the federal
navigation agency, maintains ports, inland waterways, locks and
dams. 35% of the nation's hydropower is generated from over 70
Corps facilities. While there are various other responsibilities
such as regulatory and resource management functions, many of the
Corps' historical and contemporary activities involve planning,
constructing and operating physical facilities. The agency has a
large capacity to alter and build on the physical environment.
The engineering/construction perspective is different from the
more legal/regulatory mission of other federal agencies. This
may cause the Corps to adopt different approaches to problem-
solving and to have a different set of conflicts to solve.
The structure of the Corps is also distinctive. It is highly
decentralized, with Division (regional) and District (local)
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offices operating with substantial autonomy from the Washington,
D.C. headquarters (Office of the Chief of Engineers, OCE). For
example, most of the Corps' approximately 500 attorneys work in
the District and Division offices (field offices). Thus new
dispute resolution programs established by OCE may be more
difficult to implement throughout the organization than in the
legal branch of an agency that is centralized.
While differences in history, mission and structure may mean
that the dispute resolution experience of the Corps is in some
ways not directly applicable to other agencies, other aspects of
any Corps of Engineers ADR initiative should be relevant to other
agencies. Most notably, the administrative framework for contract
dispute resolution is the same for all federal agencies. (2)
While various agencies have their own Boards of Contract Appeals,
all have experienced the problems of expanding dockets and
extended delays in the final resolution of contract disputes
(Crowell, 1988). Thus, the Corps' experiment with the use of ADR
for contract claims may be particularly interesting to other
agencies considering similar initiatives.
Environmental regulation may be another area for transfer of
ADR experience because of the similarities between the Corps'
programs and the programs of other agencies. For example, in
EPA, the Fish and Wildlife Service and analogous state agencies
regulate some of the same activities as the Corps, pursuant to
its responsibilities under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
Often, the Corps and other agencies will each have permitting
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responsibilities regarding the same proposed activity. Even
where their functions differ, experience gained by one agency in
settling environmental regulatory disputes can be applied by
others.
Thus, while some of the results of this report may be
inapplicable to other agencies because of distinctive
characteristics of the U.S. Corps of Engineers, aspects of this
study are relevant to the dispute resolution activities of other
agencies. In particular, the Corps' experience with the use of
ADR for contract claims, and the extent of the barriers
encountered, is important information to the other federal
agencies who are interested in applying ADR to contract disputes.
The findings and recommendations regarding contract claims must
be considered in the context of the Corps' unique decentralized
structure, but many of the issues related to this program are
common to contract claims settlement in general.
This study of the opportunities for, and barriers to, greater
use of alternative dispute resolution is of current practical
importance to the Corps. The agency is now planning its next
steps in the development of the ADR initiative. This study may
also interest those engaged in theoretical dispute resolution
research.
RESEARCH STRATEGY
This effort to examine the barriers to greater use of ADR
effort was initiated by the Corps to respond to the need for
improved methods for settling contract claims. (3) In the view
7
of the Chief Counsel's office, the existing appeals system
established by the Contract Disputes Act has proved inadequate.
To assess the ADR program and, specifically, the barriers to
greater use of ADR for contract disputes, I identified key agency
personnel who are knowledgeable about the organization and
important in the development of Corps policy. The respondents
were selected because of their important roles in the Corps or
because of their personal experience with Corps minitrials. They
were not chosen as a representative sample of attitudes in the
agency. Indeed, the extensive involvement of many of the
respondents in the ADR initiative and their current employment at
OCE rather than in a field office, suggests that their views may
well differ from those of the District and Division staffs.
Chief Counsel, Lester Edelman, supported this research by
encouraging OCE staff to agree to be interviewed.
I developed a set of assumptions regarding the barriers to
greater use of ADR in the Corps. These were based on initial
conversations with two Corps attorneys who coordinate the
contract claims ADR program and with a policy analyst at the
Corps' Institute for Water Resources (IWR). This individual
works on various Corps dispute resolution initiatives and has
trained Corps personnel in public participation skills. I
drafted a questionnaire which was used to focus the interviews
and to gather some standardized information from the interview
respondents. The questionnaires were sent or delivered to the
respondents and completed prior to the interview.
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Interviews, ranging from one half hour to three hours in
length, were conducted with the Corps' Chief Counsel, Deputy
Chief Counsel, Chief Trial Attorney, Senior Assistant Chief
Counsel for Legislation and General Law, Assistant Chief Counsel
for Environment and Legislation, and two Trial Attorneys. Three
other Corps attorneys attended two of the interviews at the
request of the primary respondent. These three respondents were
not asked to complete a questionnaire.
I interviewed two Administrative Judges of the Corps of
Engineers Board of Contract Appeals. One is the Chairman of the
Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals; the other, a former
Corps Division Counsel, represented the agency in a prominent
minitrial. Other Corps respondents included the Chief of the
Construction Division, the Chief of the Regulatory Branch, the
Chief of Operations and Readiness, and a Senior Policy Analyst at
the Institute for Water Resources. I interviewed four
respondents who are not employed by the Corps: the Army Chief
Trial Attorney, a law professor who served as neutral advisor in
two Corps minitrials; a former vice president of a major
construction company who represented the company in a Corps
minitrial; and the company's attorney for that minitrial. The
former vice president and the contractor's attorney did not fill
out a questionnaire. The Corps' principal in that minitrial
responded to the questionnaire but was not interviewed. He was a
Division Engineer at the time of the minitrial and currently is
Assistant Chief of Engineers for the Corps.
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All but three of the interviews were conducted in person.
Some respondents were phoned for follow-up questions. The
findings of this report are based on my interpretation of what
these key Corps personnel and informed observers said in the
interviews and questionnaire responses.
RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS
I began this research with several assumptions about barriers
to greater use of ADR in the Corps. These assumptions were based
on my initial conversations with three Corps employees; two who
have played central roles in instituting the Corps' use of ADR
for contract disputes, and a third who has promoted ADR for
various applications in the Corps. The assumptions I formed at
the outset revolved around contract disputes, though some
assumptions may also apply to use of ADR in other agency
activities.
First, I assumed that Corps personnel do not embrace ADR
procedures because they are satisfied with the Corps' current
methods for handling disputes. If, as I expected, established
conflict resolution procedures, such as the contract claims
appeals process, are seen by field office personnel as
functioning adequately, they have less reason to endorse the use
of new procedures. While other forces might still motivate Corps
employees to try ADR, such as encouragement from Chief Counsel's
office if they are, on the whole, satisfied with current
practices, then they would show little enthusiasm for the
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experiment.
Similarly, I assumed that some opposition to ADR arises from
dissatisfaction with the results of the Corps' experience with
ADR. Some technical staff have criticized the results of at
least one contract claim minitrial, saying that the government
was wrong to settle the case. (4) I expected that disappointment
with the outcome of the first ADR efforts might be widespread,
thus causing staff to resist any further use of the new
procedures.
I assumed tht another barrier to ADR in the Corps arises from
the relationships among personnel at different levels of the
organization. I expected that management and staff would oppose
ADR procedures resulting in management overruling decisions of
their subordinates. The first several minitrials conducted by
the Corps took place at the Division level of the organization.
The Division Engineer who handled the case settled a claim which
had earlier been denied by the contracting officer (CO). In
effect, the Division overruled the District CO. The conventional
contract claim process has judges reviewing and sometimes
overturning CO decisions. In some cases, the attorneys for the
government and contractor negotiate a settlement. In either
case, a professional legal specialist is handling the settlement,
rather than a management superior to whom the CO reports. I
predicted that management and staff, would resist this change in
the way contract disputes are handled.
In a related assumption, I predicted that the Corps personnel
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oppose ADR procedures which empower Division management to
resolve disputes which could be handled better by District level
employees. This expectation was also related to some internal
criticism made of the Division minitrials. Specifically, after
the settlement of a milti-million dollar "differing site
condition" claim through a minitrial, some Corps' technical staff
reportedly felt that the settlements "gave away the store"
because the government's principal, a Division Engineer, did not
understand the issues as well as the District staff who had
earlier rejected the claim. (5)
Another assumption related to attitudes about review and
criticism of decisions arises from the Tenn-Tom case. I expected
the Corps personnel to resist greater use of ADR because of a
belief that engaging in experimental procedures will increase the
risk of critical review from oversight offices such as the
Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG). The IG
investigated the Tenn-Tom settlement following a complaint from
Corps technical staff. I assumed that Corps personnel might view
minitrials and other ADR settlement techniques as risky since
they might bring on further investigations from the IG or other
oversight bodies.
My final expectation at the outset of this research was that
Corps personnel oppose greater use of ADR because they believe it
will increase their workload. Some of the minitrials have
involved two or three days of hearings and negotiations. The
time investment can be difficult for Corps management because
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they are already fully occupied with other responsibilities. I
assumed that concern with additional work would be pervasive,
causing personnel to resist the new procedures. One of the Corps
employees I spoke with in formulating these expectations
suggested that any new activity is likely to be seen as an
additional burden regardless of whether it will, in fact,
increase the workload. (6)
After I formed these ideas, I drafted the questionnaire to
include questions related to the assumptions to ensure that some
information would emerge relevant to each of them.
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CHAPTER I - FOOTNOTES
(1) This observation and the following comments regarding the
unique nature of the Corps, are the author's interpretation of
information conveyed in personal communications with Jerome Delli
Priscoli.
(2) The Contract Dispute Act of 1978, 41 U.S. Code secs. 601-
613; 5 U.S.C. sec. 5108(c)(3); 28 U.S.C. secs. 1346(a)(2),
1491(a)(2), 2401(a), 2414, 2510, 2517; 31 U.S.C. sec.
1304(a)(3)(C) (1982); enacted November 1, 1978 by Pub. L. No. 95-
563, 92 Stat. 2383; significantly amended April 2, 1982 by Pub.
L. No. 97-164, title 1, secs. 156-157, 160, 161, 96 Stat. 25. 47-
49.
(3) A senior staff analyst with the Corps' Institute for Water
Resources, Jerome Delli Priscoli, informed the author that the
Corps might benefit from a review of its alternative dispute
resolution efforts.
(4) Internal criticism of contract ADR has focused on the Tenn-
Tom case.
(5) The Tenn-Tom minitrial is discussed in detail Chapter III,
Findings.
(6) Other barriers to greater use of ADR have been suggested by
my respondents, only some of which I discuss in this report. Two
purported barriers not discussed are 1) constraints arising from
legal barriers, such as a prohibition against the use of binding
arbitration for claims against the government, and 2) constraints
due to the attitude among Corps personnel that settling claims
with contractors who perform poor work is a threat to the Corps'
professional integrity.
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II. THE CORPS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION
The U.S. Corps of Engineers, an agency known for
constructing dams and straightening rivers, is now building a
reputation for innovative methods of handling conflict. The Corps
has been particularly creative in handling disagreements with
private companies over compensation for contract work. The Corps
is exploring alternative methods of dealing with disputes over
environmental regulation and anticipating conflicts over
implementation of civil works projects. There is a spirit of
innovation in the Corps that coexists with its reputation as a
bureaucracy of "staid, old engineers primarily interested in
building things." (1) To assess the prospects for translating
the spirit of innovation into significant and lasting change in
the Corps' conflict management style, this chapter compares the
current ADR initiative with the agency's earlier shift regarding
environmental concerns and public participation.
CRITICISMS OF THE CORPS' CONVENTIONAL METHODS FOR HANDLING
CONFLICT
Dissatisfaction With The Corps' 404 Regulatory Program
The Army Corps of Engineers is responding to demands for
reform with serious efforts to improve its ways of handling
conflict. Complaints about the Corps' activities are widespread.
(OTA Wetlands Report, 1984). (2) Environmentalists, in
particular, complain that the Corps' regulatory program under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act gives short shrift to their
concerns. The regulated sector is critical of costs and
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uncertainties suffered as a result of the program. Costs of 404
regulation to the permit applicant include those incurred from
permit processing, modifications to the application, and delays.
(OTA Wetlands Report, 1984). Congress's Office of Technology
Assessment and state resource agencies have also joined the fray.
In a 1984 report, OTA notes the complaints of several state
agencies regarding COE's narrow view of its jurisdiction to
regulate, inadequate efforts to publicize the regulatory program
and generally lax enforcement and monitoring.
In many areas of the country, the Corps' 404 program is the
only government program controlling the use of wetland resources.
In the geographic area covered by a general permit (GP) recently
issued by the Vicksburg, Mississippi District, the Corps
processes about 200 applications each year dealing with
hydrocarbon drilling (Priscoli, 1988). Case-by-case reviews
consume a large amount of the District's staff time, produce
delays to the applicants and often lead to litigation. The
situation would be improved if the Corps adopts a different
approach to permitting that would reduce delays and attendant
costs while protecting the environment to the satisfaction of
advocacy groups and resource agencies.
The Corps has experimented with a new approach for regulating
404 activities. The Vicksburg District issued a general permit in
1987 for oil and gas exploration in certain wetlands of Arkansas,
Louisiana and Mississippi. General permits are not a new
regulatory devise. (3) In fact, the 1987 general permit replaces
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an earlier one which had expired. What is different about the
Vicksburg District's latest general permit is that it was based
on a consensus recommendation of industry, environmentalist and
government agency representatives.
The affect of this general permit is that individual permit
requests which meet the terms and conditions of the general
permit will be issued more quickly. The expedited processing
responds to the concerns of the regulated community and the
conditions of the permit are designed to meet the interests of
the environmental community and participating agencies for
protection of the sensitive wetland ecosystems. The Vicksburg
general permit limits the scope of hydrocarbon drilling activity
and remires that- upon completion of the drilling, the permittee
return the area to its original contours and replant all
disturbed areas with native species. Each permit applicant must
also participate in a "wetlands conservation initiative" by
contributing $200 to an agency or organization for 1)purchase of
wetlands; 2)purchase of easements to protect wetlands; or
3)projects designed to accomplish restoration or enhancement of
wetland values (Department of the Army, October 31, 1986).
The Corps' interest in negotiating a general permit with
representatives of all affected interest groups responds, in some
measure, to the criticisms of the regulatory program. In
Vicksburg, expedited processing of individual permit requests
which meet the conditions of the general permit means that the
oil and gas industry can gain authorization to drill within two
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weeks of application (Priscoli, 1988). The Corps and other
agencies can reallocate the staff time that would otherwise be
tied up in reviewing 200 individual permits each year. The
environmental interest groups know what level of protection will
be included in each individual permit and can devote their
limited resources to other battles. Corps staff believe that the
Vicksburg GP is stronger and technically more completed than what
the Corps could have generated internally (Priscoli, 1988).
Moreover, a well-conducted general permit negotiation, including
more public education and greater public involvement in writing
the permit conditions than is typical for Corps regulatory
activities, results in an improved public image for the Corps
(Priscoli, 1988;. Rosener, 1981).
Dissatisfaction With The Corps' Conventional Methods of
Contract Claim Resolution
There is a great deal of dissatisfaction in the government
contracting community with the established methods for handling
disagreements between federal agencies and their contractors
(ACUS, 1988). The current system, which evolved within the
statutory framework of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, is
characterized by a large number of cases being appealed by
contractors from the agency field level to various Boards of
Contract Appeals, and the U.S. Claims Court. Overloaded dockets
and judicialized procedures cause resolution to be delayed for
years. The Corps is experimenting with minitrials and non-
binding arbitration in contract disputes in a response to these
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delays and the attendant rising costs of contract litigation, and
disruptions to management in defending litigation (Carr, 1988).
The minitrial procedure is a "voluntary, expedited, and
nonjudicial procedure whereby top management officials
[principals] for each party meet to resolve disputes" (Edelman
and Carr, 1987). After a presentation by attorneys or other
representatives of each party, the principals meet to negotiate a
settlement. Often a neutral advisor, jointly retained by the two
sides, helps manage the process and advise the principals of the
strengths and weaknesses of each position (N&C Report, February
1987). In non-binding arbitration, the parties make a
presentation and submit relevant documents to a neutral expert
retained jointly as arbitrator. After studying the materials, the
arbitrator issues a recommended settlement to the principals who
then meet to negotiate a settlement (Carr, 1988). Both procedures
allow either party to withdraw from the process at any time and
return to litigation without prejudice.
The Corps is using ADR procedures to reduce costs and delays
and to respond to criticism from government contractors who are
"[1]argely unsatisfied with the present contract claim settlement
system." (Crowell, 1987). The Corps is one of several public
agencies with major contract claim resolution problems, but it
stands out in its willingness to try new methods for handling the
disputes.
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The New Civil Works Cost Sharing Arrangement Holds Potential
For Conflict
The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 initiated a new
feature to the relationships between the federal, state and local
governments. (5) Virtually any civil works project within the
Corps' jurisdiction must be constructed in cooperation with a
non-Federal sponsor who will shoulder twenty to sixty percent of
the project's cost. "Legally required cooperation" or mandatory
cost sharing creates the likelihood of intergovernmental
disputes. (6) Thus, the Corps has proposed a clause in each
contract providing that the parties must resolve disputes through
non-binding ADR prior to legal action. The clause states that
"Before any party to this Agreement may bring suit in any court
concerning an issue relating to this Aqreement, such party must
first seek in good faith to resolve the issue through negotiation
or other forms of non-binding alternative dispute resolution
mutually acceptable to the parties. (7) Several dozen agreements
with project sponsors now contain the ADR provision. (8)
State and local governments need the expertise and funds of
the federal government to build projects but as it was put by one
of the Corps' attorneys for Legislation and General Laws, "if
communities start hearing of other communities who are in
litigation with the Corps over our agreements, it is bad for the
government." (9) The Corps' experiment with ADR in this area is
different from those in contract disputes and the environmental
regulatory program - the water resources experiment is not so
much a response to demand for change as a recognition by
21
leadership of the Corps that the new relationship might lead to
conflicts that can be better resolved by ADR than litigation. It
also differs from the section 404 and contract disputes
initiatives in that there has not yet been an opportunity to use
the ADR approach.
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THE EXTENT AND DYNAMICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN THE CORPS OF
ENGINEERS
A casual observer might view these ADR activities as a
surprising and unprecedented change in approach for an
organization some have called the "most bureaucratic of
bureaucracies." (Rosener, 1981). A closer look reveals that
these changes, while still quite modest, are nonetheless
consistent with the way the organization changed in the past. A
review of the extent and dynamics of past change in the Corps may
help predict how the Corps will carry out its current efforts at
change.
During the late 1960s the Corps was criticized for its closed
decisionmaking and lack of responsiveness to environmental
concerns (Drew, 1980) (10) As with the current comnaints ahout.
the contract claims system, the Corps was not the only federal
agency attacked for its unresponsiveness to the needs and views
of the public. The Corps, however, was one of the agencies that
made an effort to meet the criticism.
Mazmanian and Nienaber studied the Corps' civil works
activities in the 1970s to assess the extent to which the Corps
was able to alter its mission and style (Mazmanian, 1979). While
recognizing that more time was needed to draw solid conclusions
about the course the Corps would follow, Mazmanian found that
several years after the Corps set out to change its
decisionmaking and incorporate environmental values, "the agency
moved expeditiously and rather successfully to accommodate itself
to a changing social and political environment." (Mazamanian,
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1979). Mazmanian's findings were based on four indicators of
significant organizational change: setting new goals,
reorganization, changes in output and changes in decisionmaking
procedures. He found that the Corps had indeed begun to alter its
mission and style. In particular, the Corps responded to pressure
for public participation and greater attention to environmental
quality by adopting new goals; making structural and personnel
changes; and modifying its decisionmaking process. These
alterations seemed to effect the design of Corps projects. The
question, then, is whether the Corps is once again remolding
itself with the adoption of ADR and making organizational changes
that represent a significant alteration in direction and style.
(11)
Four Indicators of the Extent of Organizational Change in
the Corps
Setting New Goals. When an organization sets new goals
it declares its aspiration for organizational change. The
leadership of the Corps made extraordinary proclamations in 1970
and thereafter, indicating that they intended to increase the
involvement of the public in civil works project planning and to
incorporate environmental concerns. For example, in February,
1971, the Chief of Engineers declared that:
In the past we have conducted our planning activities with
a relatively small percentage of the people who have
actually been concerned, primarily federal, state, and
local government officials of one kind or another. Today
there are, in addition, vast numbers of private citizens
who, individually, or in groups and organizations and
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through their chosen representatives, are not only keenly
interested in what we are doing with the Nation's water
resources but who want to have a voice and influence in
the planning and management of those resources... we cannot
and must not ignore [these] other voices...I consider
public participation of critical importance to the Corps'
effectiveness as a public servant. It is ... an area I
won't be satisfied with until we can truly say that the
Corps is doing a suburb job (Dodge, 1973).
Other aspirational statements were issued by Corps leadership
regarding the need to be more sensitive to environmental concerns
in project planning, design and implementation. These goals, if
implemented, would take the Corps in a new direction.
Historically, the Corps indicated little interest in
environmental values and exhibited a tendency to invite real and
potential project opponents into the planning process only after
the agency was largely committed to the proposal. The new
pronouncements by the Corps' leadership met the first criterion
of organizational change: setting new goals.
In the last several years, the Corps has begun to set new
goals regarding ADR. Surprisingly, leadership in this area has
come from the Chief Counsel's office. Chief Counsel Lester
Edelman has prominently proclaimed the virtues of ADR -- for
contract dispute resolution, for the new cost sharing
relationship with local civil works sponsors, and for
environmental regulatory disputes. Frank Carr, the Chief Trial
Attorney speaks regularly to field office counsel about the
contract dispute ADR initiative. Both have written articles on
the subject and are active in encouraging other agencies to use
ADR through the Administrative Counsel of the United States. Mr.
25
Edelman encouraged drafters of the model Local Cost Sharing
Agreements (LCAs) to include the ADR provision and has urged
other Corps policymakers to use ADR for environmental regulatory
disputes.
New goals regarding ADR are being expressed primarily by the
leadership of the legal branch of the Corps but other top offices
are supportive, as well. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Civil Works has reviewed and signed all the local cost sharing
agreements and approved of the ADR clause. A recent guidance
letter from the Office of the Chief of Engineers offers qualified
support for ADR use in regulatory actions. It says that ADR has
the greatest potential for regional permits but that "as a
general rule the ADR process does not appear to be suitable for
use on individual permit decisions." (Department of the Army,
April 14, 1987).
The Corps is setting new goals for using ADR as evinced by
leadership pronouncements for both internal and external
consumption. These statements are not as far-reaching as those of
the early days of the public participation program but in both
cases they do meet the first criterion of organizational change.
However, while new objectives and promises of new programs are a
necessary first step, they are of limited importance unless
accompanied by other evidence of organizational change.
Restructuring and Modifying Personnel Responsibilities.
Reorganization and changes in the roster and responsibilities of
personnel are an important indicator of long term organizational
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change. Reorganization and the infusion of new personnel can be
the mechanism for implementing substantive change announced by
the leadership's statements of new goals.
The Corps modified its structure in the early 1970s. The
Chief of Engineers created an Environmental Advisory Board,
composed of citizens to, among other things, examine Corps
policies, and programs. In each Corp District, an environmental
unit was formed. The new units were located in the planning
department, if one existed, or the engineering division. The
environmental units were primarily responsible for writing
Environmental Impact Statements. Most district offices instituted
citizen advisory groups in the first few years of the citizen
participation/environmental value initiative. Many new employees
with non-engineering perspectives were hired. The number of Corps
employees from nonengineering backgrounds surged from 75 in 1969
to 575 in 1977 (Mazmanian, 1979). The importance of new
personnel should not be underestimated. Social scientists,
biologists and others from the nonengineering sciences bring with
them their different training and values. As new employees, they
have less vested interest in traditional practices and may be
more inclined to introduce unorthodox ideas.
Only some of the 1970's reorganization lasted beyond the
first years of the decade. The Environmental Advisory Board was
dissolved early on. In the Districts, the citizen advisory units
were virtually disbanded a decade ago. Other structural and
personnel modifications in the Corps survive. The District
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environmental units are still providing environmental input into
the Corps planning process. Today there are still hundreds of
employees of nonengineering background. Moreover, the Corps
continues to train its personnel in public participation skills
through classes offered by the Institute for Water Resources. The
"basic" public involvement course, begun in the early 1970s, is
now supplemented with an "advanced" class and an "executive"
course for the agency's leadership. (12) These courses are
popular and, according to one of the trainers, constitute
"massive public involvement training."
The Corps, in its civil works function, continued as a
construction-oriented agency notwithstanding NEPA, more
environmentally-oriented employees, and a new -rganizational
objective of protecting environmental quality. The traditional
mission still dominated though environmental quality was
introduced as an auxiliary function. Given this limitation on
change, it can still be concluded that the Corps made a
considerable effort to incorporate the new policies by creating
the required organizational capacity.
A much smaller degree of structural modification is now under
way in the Corps regarding the ADR initiative. There have been no
agency-wide hiring or reorganizational steps to implement greater
use of ADR. Instead, a small but significant alteration in
responsibilities of existing personnel is under way. Like the
expression of new goals, the Chief Counsel's office is leading
the agency in this indicator of organizational change. The OCE
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(headquarters) legal branch has recently reorganized for purposes
not directly related to the ADR initiative. (Department of the
Army, November 6, 1988). (13) One of the results of the
reorganization is the grouping of the headquarters lawyers in
teams, according to substantive legal specializations. The
organizational chart represents the teams as five circular
groupings for 1) Contract Appeals, 2) Litigation, 3) Procurement,
4) Legislation and General Laws and 5) Legal Services Policy and
Programs. The change of importance to the Alternative Dispute
Resolution initiative is that Chief Counsel has appointed an "ADR
specialist" in each of the substantive area "circles." (14) The
ADR specialists report to the Chief regarding ADR activities in
their circles
This assignment of ADR specialists in the Corps headquarters
legal office is a significant step because it can be the
beginning of an infrastructure that will support greater use of
ADR in the Corps. It is appropriate that this focus comes from
the legal division since attorneys play an important role in most
of the Corps disputes with external parties. However, in the
context of a large decentralized agency, this structural change
is tiny. The legal and technical divisions in the district and
divisions have not made similar structural changes. Neither have
any steps been taken to establish an advisory body to critique
the agency like the Environmental Advisory Board of the early
1970's. (15)
While beginnings of structural changes are visible in the
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Chief Counsel's office, the agency as a whole has not taken major
steps to reorganize its structure or personnel to implement its
ADR initiative. Thus, this second criterion of change in the
Corps has not yet been met.
Modifying Decisionmaking Procedures. Open
decisionmaking processes may be linked to a public agency's
commitment to change (Mazmanian, 1979). When an agency opens its
doors to those previously ignored, this indicates that it is
serious about adopting new missions or otherwise altering its
usual patterns of behavior. In the absense of open
decisionmaking, traditional constituencies will prevail. Through
case studies, Mazmanian found that the Corps has ample capacity
in this area. Whenever the Corps made a substantial effort to
open the planning process to the public, a greater balance
between environmental and economic considerations was achieved.
The Corps developed a greater appreciation of the diversity of
interest in the communities in which it engaged in open planning
and the process enabled new and previously ignored interests to
press their demands and in some instances to contribute
previously overlooked alternatives. This modification in the
Corps decisionmaking process was substantial, where adopted.
Overall, though, the evaluation on this measure was mixed in the
field depending on District initiatives and local demands.
This limited indication of change regarding greater use of an
open decisionmaking process in the civil works function of the
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Corps is further confined by Mazmanian's finding that "the
present coolness of the agency to its experiences with open
planning raises the serious question of whether the Corps will
make a major effort to continue with it agency-wide."
The current ADR initiative involves some modifications in the
Corps decisionmaking processes. The contract claim ADR program
brings new players into settlement discussions: the principals
for the Corps and the contractor. The neutral advisor, when used,
adds an objective viewpoint to the deliberations. The procedure
is designed to get more information into the decisionmaker's
hands than the conventional contract dispute resolution methods.
While these adaptations in decisionmaking
significant, they do not represent the kind of
decisionmaking process that indicates major
change. The contract disputes settlement process
to new interests. Rather, the ADR methods are a
to improve the management of contract claims
different representatives of the disputants
setting that gives them information they need
negotiations.
procedures are
opening of the
organizational
is not opened up
reform designed
by designating
and creating a
for settlement
Similarly, the ADR clause in local cost sharing agreements
does not yet involve an opening of the process to real and
potential critics of the civil works projects. Here, however,
lies strong potential for a new opening of the process. The Corps
has the opportunity, as it molds the new federal-local
relationship, to incorporate greater participation for
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representatives of interests beyond the governmental sponsors of
the project. A vigorous public involvement program that builds on
the Corps experience with public participation, could begin with
broad participation in planning and continue through
implementation of projects. Then, representatives of all affected
interest groups would be invited to join project implementation
committees that work with the Corps and the local sponsors as the
project is completed. Problems that require dispute resolution
would be tackled under the ADR clause with the involvement of all
the represented interests. This tack, not currently contemplated
by the Corps, would open civil works projects to a broader level
of public participation and would certainly indicate
organizational change regarding ADR.
The current environmental regulatory ADR initiative is still
limited to a single negotiated general permit. If expanded, the
approach could represent another sign of organizational change
through the opening of decisionmaking to interests not otherwise
included. The general permit experiments have brought together
developers, environmentalists and agency representatives to
negotiate the conditions of a Section 404 regional permit for
wetlands activities. Normally, public opponents to 404 permit
applications may comment on proposed permits but have little
direct influence over whether a permit will be issued, or if
issued, what conditions will be attached. The negotiated general
permit empowers environmental and other community interests to
negotiate alongside representatives of the regulated community
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and the relevant state and federal agencies. The general permit
issued by the Vicksburg District after this process, was based on
recommendations reached consensually by all the participating
representatives. This approach, if applied more widely by the
Corps would be a strong indication of institutional change as
measured by changes in the decisionmaking process.
Altering Organizational Output. This final criterion
of organizational change is, in a sense, the "bottom line" of
agency activity - the productive output of the organization. The
question here is what effect the changes in structure, personnel,
and procedures has had on Corps projects. Mazmanian, in applying
this criterion to the Corps' activities of the early 1970s, noted
two factors that make such evaluations difficult (Mazmanian,
1979). First, since the Corps' civil works projects take from
years to decades to complete, the work load of the agency during
the study was composed of projects already under way and in
various stages of completion. The effect of new programs such as
those to expand public participation and environmental
consideration, are not fully seen in such ongoing projects.
Second, it is difficult to make a causal connection between
personnel and structural changes and specific changes in agency
policy or specific projects.
Given these qualifications, Mazmanian found examples of
changes in ongoing projects that were identified by agency
personnel as direct results of the commitment to an
environmentally sensitive policy. One measure of altered results
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is the number of civil works projects which were modified as a
result of environmental review. Reportedly, a large number of
projects were modified as a result of the NEPA review process.
For example, in the San Francisco District, the Sonoma Creek
project, created to improve flood control, was designed with an
"overflow bypass" feature instead of channelizing the creek.
Acreage was set aside on either side of the creek to allow an
overflow into a greenbelt area during floods. This is an example
of the incorporation of nonstructural solutions into flood
control projects -- an approach urged by many in the
environmental community.
Mazmanian's conclusions regarding different output due to the
organizati onal efforts studied are strongly qualified. He note
"promising indications that the agency is translating the
environmental mission into new programs" and found that "old
projects have been modified and more environmentally sound and
socially sensitive ones are on the drawing board."
In recent years, there has been a reduction in the number of
structural water resources projects, but this can be explained,
in part, through a Congressional stalemate that lasted from the
late 1970s to the passage of the Water Resources Development Act
of 1986. The Corps civil works projects go through public review
more extensive than before the 1970s but the extent of public
participation is closer to information sharing than power
sharing. (16) The public participation in the environmental
regulatory program is limited to comment on proposed permits. The
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prime instances of power sharing with environmental interest
groups in recent years is the Vicksburg general permit (GP)
negotiations -- not an impressive result for an organization that
issues about 14,000 permits a year. On the other hand, even this
single negotiated general permit is significant. The consensus-
based GP drew only a few comments during the public comment
period and no one requested a public hearing. The Vicksburg
District expects about 200 individual permit applications under
the GP each year. If the GP operates as anticipated for its five
year duration, about 1,000 permits may be processed much more
quickly, with less government review required and a reduction in
subsequent litigation. (17)
The current ADR program is open for mixed review of its
altered output as compared with the conventional conflict
resolution methods. Ten contract claims have been resolved with
minitrials and related ADR settlement procedures out of thousands
that were appealed to through the conventional system during that
period. The environmental regulatory program has taken the first
step towards use of ADR. The civil works cost sharing arrangement
may soon prove to be a field of extensive ADR activity but, as
yet, offers only a promise of improved resolution of civil works
disputes. The extent of the Corps' ADR activity is, so far,
modest. The program is just beginning and it is too early to
evaluate the results of the Corps' use of ADR. There isn't yet
enough data to judge whether settlements reached with ADR were
"better" than what would have resulted from a conventional
35
process (Susskind and Ozawa, 1986).
Conclusions Regarding the Extent of Organizational Change in
the Corps.
There were signs of significant change in the style and
mission of the Corps in the 1970s. The agency announced dramatic
new missions of public participation and greater attention to
environmental values, and underwent a substantial degree of
structural change to accomplish the new priorities. To a lesser
extent, the agency modified its decisionmaking process. The
products of the Corps' planning and construction seemed to be
different than before this period of evolution.
Applying these four indicators to the Corps current move
towards Alternative Dispiite Resolution; T conclude that the
agency is again beginning to change itself. However, the change
is even more tentative than that noted in the early 1970s. Some
of the Corps' leadership, particularly in the legal branch, are
expressing new goals regarding how the agency deals with various
forms of conflict. Some reassignment of responsibilities is under
way by Chief Counsel though this can hardly be called
reorganization. In the instances when the Corps used ADR, it
experimented with different ways of making decisions. It is too
early to evaluate whether the output of these altered
decisionmaking approaches is substantially different than from
conventional processes.
In the early 1970s, the Corps showed signs of organizational
change but is not cleat that the new approaches resulted in a
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permanently transformed agency. Similarly, in the late 1980s, the
Corps is once again showing signs, albeit tentative, of change.
This nascent move towards ADR can not yet be described as a deep
and lasting change in the mission and style of the Corps.
However, these beginnings may be the seeds of a significant
reform in the way the Corps handles conflict with businesses,
public and private organizations and individuals.
The most important effect of the Corps' greater incorporation
of public participation and environmental considerations in the
civil works program of the 1970s may be an improved image
(Mazmanian, 1979; Rosener, 1981). This was perhaps the clearest
reward for the agency in the five civil works cases studied "by
Mazmanian, and the two regulatory cases of expanded participation
public participation examined by Rosener. A current Corps
employee who trains COE personnel in public participation skills
concurs that a better public image is a primary affect of his
program. (18)
Legitimacy is particularly important to public agencies.
Public participation and flexible, nonadversarial modes of
conflict resolution can be means to that end. Measures to achieve
greater legitimacy imply a response to pressure for such change.
How extensive was the pressure for change in the Corps in the
1970s and is there a commensurate pressure on the agency to adopt
ADR at this time?
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PRESSURES FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN THE CORPS
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, numerous federal and
state agencies were sharply criticized for the content of their
programs and the decisionmaking process for design and
implementation of agency initiatives. Segments of the population
traditionally excluded from public policy decisions sought a
broadening of participation to create programs more responsive to
their needs.
Environmental issues were among the concerns that activists
pushed onto the national agenda. The deteriorating quality of the
natural environment was decried by a broad segment of the
citizenry. Congress responded to the environmental movement and
translated some of its objectives into federal legislation. The
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) was the most
far-reaching of these statutory initiatives in terms of its
impact on the procedures of federal agencies. It required, among
other things, that agencies contemplating major federal actions,
consider the environmental consequences of their action.
Environmental legislation and strong public concern alone
are, of course, insufficient to bring about major programmatic
changes. Even with presidential directives and pronouncements
from agency leaders, policy may or may not be effectively
implemented. It is at the operating levels of government, within
the agencies and departments, that policy changes succeed or
fail. Government bureaus not only administer the programs
mandated by the elected representatives but write the regulations
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and interpret the policies which mold the legislative initiatives
into their day to day form.
The Corps changed, to some degree, in response to these
public pressures. The pressure on the Corps went beyond
generalized criticism of public agency decisionmaking. The Corps,
because of its numerous and high profile civil works projects was
directly critioized. Local groups dissatisfied with the Corps'
projects began to effectively oppose specific plans. For example,
in 1967, three faculty members of the University of Illinois
organized local opposition to to a planned flood control project
for the Sangamon River in central Illinios (Mazmanian, 1979;
Findley and Marlin, 1971).
In the early 1950s, civic leaders in the town of Decatur,
Illinois grew concerned about the city's water supply. The local
reservoir, Lake Decatur, was filling with silt. They formed. an
advisory committee which recommended to the City Council the
construction of a dam and reservoir at Oakley, Illinois, on the
upper end of Lake Decatur. Coincidentally, the Corps already had
a plan to build a reservoir at Oakley to provide flood control
along the Sangamon River. The City Council negotiated with the
Corps and by 1961 they agreed on the construction of a
multipurpose dam and reservoir to provide water, flood control
and recreational opportunities. Sponsors secured Congressional
authorization in 1962. During the subsequent final design and
engineering stage (between 1962 and 1966) water quality control
was added as a feature of the project. The Oakley dam would be
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increased in size to store more water needed to dilute effluent
form the Decatur sewage treatment plant. This modification,
designed to increase the reservoir's storage capacity, required
an extension of the reservoir from the originally authorized 10-
mile length up the Sangamon, to 25 miles. The extended Oakley
lake would cover parts of Allerton Park, a woodland preserve
owned by the University of Illinois. The university
administration initially objected, then decided not to fight the
host of local, state and federal proponents of the project. The
three faculty members took up the battle and in 1967 organized
the Committee on Allerton Park.
The committee organized a team of engineers and scientists to
counter the Corps' expertise, retained counsel and recruited
local support. They drafted a counterproposal which rebutted each
point the Corps used to justify the project. They argued that
there was little need for additional water supply, asserted the
likelihood of nitrate pollution and demonstrated that the
recreational and flood control benefits were overstated. They
recomputed the Corps' benefit-cost figures, a calculation central
to the justification for any civil works project. The committee
proposed an alternate plan to achieve most of the Oakley
Project's purported benefits by treating the upper Sangamon
watershed for erosion control, developing a greenbelt, and using
well water for Decatur.
The Committee on Allerton Park succeeded in killing the
Oakley Dam Project. By 1975 the Corps' Chicago District declared
40
the project inactive, ostensibly because of inadequate economic
justification. The group stopped the Corps of Engineers using
economic and engineering expertise to buttress the less tangible
values of aesthetics and conservation. Many other battles between
the Corps and project opponents followed.
In the following years, the Corps found itself in a defense
posture to which it was unaccustomed. The pressure of public
complaints felt by the federal bureaucracy during that period,
was particularly focused on the Corps and its highly visible
projects.
There is not now a commensurate outcry for the Corps to
change its dispute resolution procedures. Surely, there is
widespread criticism of how the Corps handles conflict, as noted
in the introduction to this chapter. However, the contemporary
pressure for change in the Corps is much weaker than in the
1960s. An full assessment of the current pressures for change is
beyond the scope of this study. (19) It is important, though,
for advocates of greater use of ADR in the Corps' to consider the
extent of the forces pushing for this change and ways to increase
the pressure. Without a substantial increase in the demand for
change, organizational inertia and the interests of the status
quo will likely prevail.
Modest change in dispute resolution procedures is occurring
in the Corps at this time. The pressure for such change is less
than what the Corps experienced in the comparative period of the
1960s and 1970s. However, pressure for change is a dynamic force.
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It ebbs and flows over the years. Light pressure and moderate
change can build to extensive and organized demands for basic
reform. However, pressure alone does not bring about change.
Countervailing forces constrain the impact of demands for change.
The following chapter examines some of constraints and barriers
to greater use of ADR in the Corps.
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CHAPTER II - FOOTNOTES
(1) Interview with John Elmore.
(2) Interviews with Ron Allen, John Elmore, Wesley Jockisch,
Jack Lemley, Ralph Nash, William Robertson, and Lance Wood.
(3) As provided by regulations printed in the Federal Register
on July 22, 1982, as amended in the October 5, 1984 Federal
Register, general permits may be issued for a category or
categories of activities when: 1)those activities are
substantially similar in nature and cause only minimal individual
and cumulative environmental impacts; or 2) the general permit
would result in avoiding unnecessary duplication of the
regulatory control exercised by another Federal, State or local
agency provided it has been determined that the environmental
consequences of the action are individually and cumulatively
minimal.
(4) Chapter III, Findings of this report includes an extended
discussion of the reasons for and depth of dissatisfaction with
current contract dispute resolution methods.
(5) Public Law 99-662.
(6) See Corps memorandum on ADR for Cost-Shared Water Resources
Projects.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Interview with Ron Allen.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Interview with John Elmore.
(11) Mazmanian's work is controversial in the Corps. It has been
criticized, in particular, for its narrow scope. It includes five
case studies from the early years of the public involvement
program and considers only the civil works function of the Corps
(personal communication with Jerome Delli Priscoli). While this
report compares the organizational change examined by Mazmanian
with current change regarding ADR, it does not attempt to
systematically critique or revise the earlier findings with new
data.
(12) Interview with Jerome Delli Priscoli.
(13) The reorganization has shifted attorneys responsibilities
to give individuals with subject matter expertise more
independence and responsibility. The former "straight-line
hierarchical structure" has been modified to "create [an]
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environment for creative thinking and leadership." The attorneys
are now organized as teams with common areas of legal expertise.
(14) Interview with Sabrina Simon.
(15) The Office of the Chief Counsel is currently seeking an
infusion of ADR ideas by using the IPA program to hire one or
more academic experts in the field to advise counsel on a
temporary basis.
(16) Interview with John Elmore.
(17) The general permit negotiations represent an evolution from
public participation program to ADR. Both initiatives seek to
improve agency decisionmaking by involving more people in the
process and encouraging non-adversarial problem solving. The
Vicksburg GP could be considered the latest step in Corps public
participation or the beginning of a new ADR effort.
(18) Interview with Jerome Delli Priscoli.
(19) Discussion in Chapter III, Findings, regarding satisfaction
with dispute resolution procedures is pertinent to the subject of
pressure for change.
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III. FINDINGS
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III. FINDINGS
INTRODUCTION
This research identifies some of the barriers to greater use
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the U.S. Corps of
Engineers. A better understanding of constraints against greater
use of ADR will help the Corps' leadership determine the next
steps in its efforts to improve its management of conflict. The
focus of this research is the Corps' experience with ADR to
settle contract disputes. The Corps also applies ADR to other
conflicts, notably in environmental regulation disputes and in
the local cost sharing agreements with local sponsors of water
resource projects. I offer my observations about these important
new applications of ADR in the Recommendations Chapter of this
report. This Findings Chapter focuses on the Corps' use of ADR
for contract disputes. My findings on this subject are divided
into three sections corresponding to the three themes which
emerge from this research.
In the first theme I discuss my findings about the Corps' and
other parties' satisfaction with contract dispute resolution
procedures. I apply the data to my assumption that Corps
personnel are satisfied with the current procedures and are
dissappointed with the initial ADR experiments. In the second
section of this chapter I review the data relevant to my
expectation that limited resources in the agency constrain the
application of ADR to contract disputes. In the last portion of
the findings I discuss the importance of the organizational level
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at which contract dispute resolution takes place in the Corps and
the affect of oversight on the attitudes of agency personnel. I
apply the data to my three initial expectations: Corps personnel
oppose contract ADR because it results in management overruling
staff decsions; Corps personnel oppose contract ADR because it
empowers Division-level management to resolve disputes which
should be handled at the District; and, Corps personnel oppose
contract ADR because they think that engaging in experimental
procedures increases the risk of critical review from oversight
offices.
The data regarding these three themes offer interesting and
sometimes surprising insights into my assumptions and form the
basis for my recommendations.
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SATISFACTION WITH CONVENTIONAL AND ADR CONTRACT DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Overview
User satisfaction with methods for resolving disputes is a
key measure of their success (Susskind, 1987). If, for example,
the officials and field staff of a federal agency believe that
established administrative procedures for resolving differences
with contractors work well, they will have no reason to seek a
change. Similarly, if the personnel feel that experiments with
new methods of dispute resolution have yielded unsatisfactory
results, than they will oppose further experimentation. Two of
my initial assumptions mirror these expected attitudes.
I assumed that Corps personnel do not support alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) initiatives because they believe that
the agency is already handling conflicts in a satisfactory manner
and that they oppose greater use of ADR because they are
disappointed with the results of the Corps's experience with ADR.
My data indicate that neither hypothesis is correct. In fact,
interviews and questionnaire results suggest the opposite
conclusions. My respondents are not satisfied with current Corps
procedures for handling conflict and they are pleased with the
results of the agency's use of ADR, to date.
Most respondents believe that current Corps dispute
resolution mechanisms are not working as well as they should and
that new techniques should be tried. Most of those filling out
the questionnaire (10/12) did not agree that "ADR is unnecessary
because current Corps mechanisms for handling disputes are
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satisfactory." In fact, most disagreed strongly. All believed
that "ADR techniques are a useful supplement to traditional
methods of resolving disputes," and that "The Corps should use
ADR more often." (1)
Dissatisfaction with current dispute resolution methods is
clearest in the area of contract disputes. 10/12 of the
questionnaire answers asserted that the Corps should expand its
use of ADR in handling contract claims. Interviews corroborated
this evidence. The bulk of the Corps' experience with ADR has
been in the contract claim area and most of my interviews focused
on this subject. Consequently, this chapter deals primarily with
contract dispute resolution. It explores the reasons for the low
level of satisfaction with the conventional methods for
resolution of contract diputes and the attitudes of Corps
personnel and other interested observers towards contract claim
ADR. (2)
For over a century, the government has used quasi-judicial
administrative bodies to resolve disagreements that could not be
settled under informal regulations (Shedd, 1966). During the
Civil War, Secretary of War Simon Cameron appointed a federal
board to hear claims regarding ship construction contracts. In
the following years, government contracts commonly authorized
contractors to appeal a government contract officer's decision to
the agency head. A formal appeal board was established in 1918
and in a period of four years it and its successor disposed of
over 3,000 cases. A Navy Board was set up in 1942 which was
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ultimately subsumed into the Armed Servces Board of Contract
Appeals in 1949.
After World War II, the number and size of government
contracts grew along with the roster of government agencies with
their own contract appeals boards. Even without authorizing
legislation, at least ten agencies created boards by the early
1960's. These efforts were directed at lightening the burden on
top officials and giving contractors an option of avoiding the
cost and delay of the courts (Crowell, 1988).
By today's standards, the early contract appeals boards held
informal and expeditious hearings. Little discovery was
permitted and cases were generally presented in a condensed
manner. The contractor knew that if the case were lost at the
board, the U.S. Court of Claims would allow a full-blown de novo
trial on the merits. That is, until 1963.
Board decisions took on greater import after the U.S. Supreme
Court held, in United States v. Bianchi, that the findings of
fact by the boards of contract appeals are final and binding
regarding disputes arising under the contract. (3) Such
determinations are subject to review by the Court of Claims only
on the administrative record. Thus, de novo hearings on the
merits were no longer available under the remedy-granting clauses
of a contract. The boards of contract appeals thereafter played
a more powerful role in resolving contract disputes.
The government contractors' bar, concerned with procedural
due process, brought pressure in the 1960s to reform board
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procedures to allow discovery and more extensive hearings. This
"judicialization" of board procedures caused disputes to become
more heavily "lawyered" as dockets filled and backlogs increased.
(Spector, 1971)
The boards were finally given a statutory basis with the
passage of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA) (4). The
Contract Disputes Act was intended to make the resolution of
government contract claims more consistent, fair and efficient.
(Crowell, 1988) (5) Under the CDA, all federal agencies employ
the same basic procedure.
A contractor's claim, if not resolved informally, is first
presented to the contracting officer (CO), an agency employee
whose function is to enter into and administer government
contracts. The CO, who represents the governemnt as a party to
the contract, also make the initial decision on the dispute. (6)
If the CO decides against the contractor, a written statement is
issued which includes the reasons for the decision and an
explantion of the contractor's appeal rights. The contractor may
appeal either to the agency board of contract appeals or to the
U.S. Claims Court. An adverse decision at either forum can then
be appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. (7)
The contracting officer is obviously a key player in the
contract dispute resolution process. The CO is empowered to
negotiate and settle most contract claims. In the Corps of
Engineers, the CO is a District-level employee. The established
process is aimed at early settlement of disagreement. One
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respondent called it a "claims avoidance system."
The system is set up for settlement. The CO is a
negotiator. It is set up as a claims avoidance system in
the first instance. The CO's job is to deal with problems
as they occur. The only time we have a claim is when the
administrative system breaks down.
The CO can settle a disagreement with the contractor. If
unsuccessful, the contractor can informally appeal to officials
in the Corps district or division. Alternatively, the
contractor can go directly to the Corps of Engineers Board of
Contract Appeals.
The main point is that when talking about disposing of
government contract disputes, you must discuss the whole
process. How do you maximize the possibility of settling
at each stage. There will be some small residue of cases
that will have to go to the Board.
Satisfaction With Conventional Contract Dispute Resolution
Civil works contract cases not settled at the district level
of the Corps can be appealed by the contractor to the Army Corps
of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals. (8) 10/12 of the
questionnaire respondents expressed their dissatisfaction with
conventional contract resolution mechanisms by indicating that
the Corps should expand its use of ADR for contract claims.
However, one Corps respondent, the Chief of the Civil
Construction Division, would remedy the Board backlog problem by
expanding the size of the Board before developing new procedures
for contract claim settlement.(9) His view is that the
established system is better than the minitrial procedure,
specifically when the minitrial is conducted at the Division-
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level of the organization where there is less relevant expertise.
(10, 11)
One attorney I spoke with is satisfied with the current
government contracts disputes procedure. (12) As Deputy Chief
Trial Attorney for the U.S. Army, he oversees the government's
case preparation for appeals to the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals. (13) This respondent asserted that the
settlement activities in which his attorneys engage are much like
ADR.
This office has settled more cases than any of the other
branches. We settle approximately 65% - 70% of the cases
that come to us. That is ADR if you like. We've never
done a minitrial. We don't have any cases for which it is
suitable. I'm not opposed to minitrials. Nobody I've
talked to in the Army is opposed to minitrials.
While assuring that he is not opposed to ADR, and emphasizing
that he is not critisizing the Corps of Engineers for its
contract dispute resolution experiment, this supervising attorney
expressed satisfaction with the Army's current dispute resolution
methods. As an example of their succsessful methods, he
described a custodial contract case that was settled before trial
at the Board, but after docketing. The company which was
providing custodial services for a government facility had
recieved numerous deficiency reports for providing substandard
services. Relations between the contractor and the the
government's representatives deteriorated during the course of
the contract as the CO documented the poor custodial work. The
CO invested a lot of time in preparing the case and complained of
harassment by the contractor and the contractor's attorney. The
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contractor was adamant and claimed that the Co was being unfair.
The government sought liquidated damages under the contract
which was "in effect, a penalty" against the contractor. Army
counsel assigned to the case discussed the matter with the
contractor's lawyer and agreed that damages should be set
"somewhere in the middle" (between no penalty and the amount
sought by the government.) There were several unsucessful
negotitation sessions with the lawyers and the principals. The
attorneys urged settlement but the pricipals resisted. Finally,
the ASBCA judge assigned to the case met with the parties at the
request of counsel. He successfully "encouraged" the principals
to settle.
My respondent offered that the process that led to settlement
of the custodial contract dispute "could have been formalized,
structured and called 'alternative dispute resolution."' Indeed,
it is not uncommon for attorneys and judges to consider
settlement conferences a form of ADR. (14) However, it is
oversimplifying to lump together settlement conferences presided
over by a judge assigned to hear the trial and a minitrial
settlement procedure conducted by the principals and held earlier
in the dispute. While a settlement conference is undoubtedly a
useful way to encourage resolution prior to hearing, it does not
offer all the advantages of a minitrial or related procedures.
The minitrial discussions are controlled by the parties to the
dispute. The attorneys present their arguments to the
principals. Experts and the neutral advisor (if used) also serve
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to give the principals the technical and legal information they
need to hold settlement negotiations. The principals focus the
proceedings on the information they deem important.
A judicial settlement conference, on the other hand, offers
the principals a chance to hear the judge's assessment of the
case but does not typically generate new technical information.
Moreover, by the time the judicial settlement conference occurs,
the parties have expended more time and money preparing the case.
This resource investment may make the principals and their
attorneys less willing to settle than if a settlement procedure
had taken place earlier.
The custodial contract case, described by my respondent,
might have been a good candidate for a minitrial or a nonbinding
arbitration. The CO and the contractor had battled to the point
of generating bad blood. This may have contributed to their
unwillingness to settle. The government and the contractor could
have scheduled a minitrial choosing representatives who had not
previously been involved in the conflict. While even a minitrial
requires a significant investment in preparation by the lawyers
and prinicipals, the facts and documents assembled will be needed
anyway, in case of trial. Moreover, an earlier deadline alone
can expedite settlement as it forces the parties to focus on the
strengths and weaknesses of both positions. (15)
Second-guessing how an earlier settlement might have been
achieved is a speculative venture. It is impossible to know,
without a much more detailed inquiry, whether the custodial
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contract case could have been successfully settled with a
minitrial. However, it seems the potential was there. An
earlier and equally satisfactory settlement might have been
reached if the parties could have stepped back from their
personal clash, assigned fresh representatives as principals and
used a procedure to place all the relevant information in the
principals' hands. The investment in the procedure seems worth
the cost - even if settlement was not reached, most of the work
would assist the disputants in pursuing their case before the
Board.
As in the Corps, the Army counsel conduct discovery after a
contractor appeals a case to the Board. If information surfaces
which indicates that the government's case is weak than "those
cases are easy to settle," my Army respondent told me.
Elaborating on the type of approach used in the custodial case,
he explained that if the government department against whom the
claim has been made is hesitant to settle "we have used the Board
[judges] to cajole our clients to settle." Drawing a further
comparison to ADR, this respondent said:
ADR is designed to put the facts in front of the
decisionmakers. It is important to do that and we have
done that. We've gone to headquarters and told them "we've
got a loser but the people down there [in the field
offices] don't agree." So we persude the higher authority
to make a decision to settle. That's all ADR is.
Providing senior officials an assessment of the weaknesses of
the government's case does give them useful information. In a
factually simple case, where field personnel refuse to settle
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primarily becasue of interpersonal issues, the approach may be
successful and efficient. However, if the strength of the
government's position is not so clear-cut, or if senior officials
are already inclined to support their subordinates, a meeting
between counsel and management may not be adequate. In such a
case, a minitrial may surface more of the information that the
decisionmaker needs to make a decision overruling his or her
subordinate.
For instance, in a hypothetical case of a long-simmering
dispute between a CO and construction contractor over a requested
contract modification, the respective organizations have become
alienated. The case is complicated, revolving around whether the
government, in issuing bid specification for an ammunition depot,
adequately informed the contractor of the liklihood that the
water table would be reached at a twenty foot depth at the
construction site, rather than the expected thirty foot level.
The government included in the bid information, all hydrogeologic
charts available at the time. As the bid was being prepared, the
contractor's staff interpreted the charts to indicate a lower
water table than was subsequently discovered. The government now
maintains that the charts could have been interpreted to
correctly predict the actual conditions. If the contract is not
modified to allow the contractor more compensation, the company
will lose several hundred thousand dollars on the project.
The CO has remains adament in refusing to modify the
contract. Because of the size and importance of the contract, he
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keeps his superiors informed of the dispute throughout the two
years of the construction. They have supported his position.
The contractor appeals to the Board and government counsel review
the documents. After reading the report of an independent
hydogeologist, counsel decide that the government's case is weak.
The CO and his superiors refuse to change their position. Higher
management, unconvinced by counsel or the technical report that
their earlier position was incorrect, refuse to compromise.
While not certain that the government will win, the officials are
more comfortable deferring the decision to the Board than trying
to figure out the complexities of the case. Government counsel
in this hypothetical, must procede to prepare the defense. At
trial, the opposing counsel will challange one another's experts
and seek to obscure from the judge, any information damaging to
their client's position. This technical dispute was initiated in
the context of animosity between the parties and ends with a
judicial decision based on discovery documents and the arguments
of two attorneys. It took years to resolve and the conclusion
may or may not be as wise as one the parties might have designed.
If the government loses, it must pay interest from the time the
appeal was filed.
Had a non-binding arbitration procedure been chosen instead,
the principals on both sides would have been presented with an
assessment of the case from one or more neutral experts. This
process would have boiled the data down to its essentials for the
decisionmakers and provided both sides the basis both for a wise
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settlement. If the government postion was deemed incorrect, the
arbitrator's report would provide adequate justification for the
government prinicpal to overturn the denial of the claim. The
procedure could have taken place as soon as the dispute was ripe,
perhaps months or years prior to the Board's decision. A
negotiated settlement, following this sort of ADR procedure might
result in an improved relationship between the government and the
contractor compared to the BCA process. Moreover, if the
proceudure did not result in settlement, the Board hearing would
have occured as scheduled.
Lawyers, of course, carefully consider their settlement
strategy for all cases. My Army counsel respondent explained
that a determination is made of the likelihood of losing and the
probable cost of losing versus settlement. That calculation is
at the center of the settlement strategy.
When we assess a case we make an estimate of what we will
definately lose and what we will possbly lose. That spread
is the settlement area. If the spread is narrow (say
$50,000) the litigation costs are more significant. If the
spread is $4 million, the litigation costs are not so
important [in the settlement determination.]
This attorney, then, does not see litigation costs as an
important disadvantage in the appeal of major contract disputes
when the government has a strong case.
We need to continue to look at cases. Continue to direct
attention to settle cases in the best interest of the
clients. But the cost of litigation are not the most
important cost in a dispute. Losing is the biggest cost.
While the procedures of the Contract Disputes Act apply to
disputes handled by the Corps counsel and the Army Chief Trial
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Attorney's offices alike, there is an important difference
between the organization of the two legal branches. All of the
Army counsel reside at headquarters, in Washington D.C. The
structure of Corps counsel's offices, on the other hand, is
decentralized in the field offices around the nation. When the
District or Division Engineer has a legal problem, he walks down
the hall to discuss it with his lawyer. This closer relationship
may affect the attitude and advice of counsel. For example,
according to one Corps attorney, a district attorney might be
"afraid to tell the engineer that he is barking up the wrong
tree."
On the other hand, being close to the day-to-day activities
and personnel of the field office gives counsel access to
informal information that can be useful in assessing and
proceeding with a dispute. To prepare for contract claim, Corps
District personnel assemble a technical analysis and a legal
analysis. A former District counsel explained that the
engineering staff who are preparing the packet don't always
compile all the relevant information. "Sometimes the engineering
and construction people might not be willing to go back to the
contractor" to gather more information than is provided by the
Corps project engineer. Also, as the case is prepared, "people
naturally tend to filter facts" based on their judgment of what
is important and helpful for the government's case. Since the
Corps attorneys who prepare the case are at the District, they
can easily discuss a matter with a technical staff person
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knowledgeable about the dispute or quickly access the
documentation if any gaps in the case become apparent.
A disadvantage of the closer relationship engendered by the
Corps' decentralized legal function is the psychological affect
on Corps counsel of defending against a claim that his or her
associates have already denied. There may be an increased
tendency to adopt the position taken by the client in a way that
would cloud an objective analysis of the case. My Army counsel
respondent, while not critisizing the Corps on this point, did
explain that unlike the Corps
Only two of my 19 respondents expressed much satisfaction
with the established system of contract dispute resolution. One
of them, the Army Deputy Chief Trial Attorney believes that the
conventional contact claim system results in a high settlement of
Army cases and that ADR procedures offer no advantages for cases
within his jurisdiction. The Army's trial function is
centralized while the Corps of Engineers attorneys are mostly
located in the field offices. This may partially explain the
Army respondent's higher level of satisfaction with conventional
procedure compared to the Corps' legal counsel. The Corps
respondent most satisfied with the conventional contract dispute
resolution procedure, is concerned about the relative
disadvantages of ADR; namely, that Division-level minitrials may
not lead to wise resolution of contract claims. This issue is
taken up later in this chapter. Other respondents, while not
suggesting that the conventional system be abandoned, are eager
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to develop supplements to the system to allow more cases to be
resolved outside of the judicialized adminstrative process.
A large proportion of Corps and private sector professionals
involved in government contracting agree that the traditional
appeals process has become too costly, and too time-consuming.
(16) Corps officials, contractors and their respective counsel
believe that the process of resolving disagreements needs reform.
This has led the Corps Chief Counsel's office to experiment with
minitrials, non-binding arbitration, disputes resolution panels
and other settlement techniques. (Edelman and Carr, 1987)
Interest in improving resolution of contract disputes has risen
steadily since the early seventies. (Crowell,1988) In 1972, the
congressionally-created Commission on Government Procurement
recommended informal conferences be held prior to appeal of a
contracting officer's decision. Other recommendations followed
and a variety of contract dispute resolution experiments have
ensued.
Notwithstanding delays and the growing backlog before the
Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals, many contract
dispute cases are settled by the lawyers prior to the Board
hearing. Law Professor Ralph Nash, an expert in government
contracting, pointed out that settlements often take place prior
to formal hearings.
Even without ADR, a half of the cases docketed for the
Board get settled. Why? When the parties docket their case
they don't even know what their case is about. After some
discovery, they settle.
Non-judicial settlement occurs quite often. The Corps of
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Engineers does not keep statistics on settlement rates but
Professor Nash's estimate of half of docketed cases settling
before trial seems reaonable. Army trial attorneys (a distinct
organization from the Army Corps of Engineers' legal branch)
settles appoximately two-thirds of the over-two hundred cases it
handles each year. (17) Yet, delays and backlogs grow.
The docket of the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract
Appeals (COEBCA) grew from 169 in March 1982 to 243 cases in
Spetember 1987, an increase of over 43%. The Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) docket expanded even more
during that period, swelling from 201 case in 1982 to 364 last
September. The U.S. Claims Court, which has concurrent
jurisdiction with the the Boards, is not exempt from the problem.
Their load has more than tripled, 23 cases were waiting to be
heard by the Court in 1982, 81 were on the docket in September,
1987. (18) While a contractor has a right to take a contract
dispute to a BCA or the U.S. Claims Court, the choice is between
two essentially "equal forums embued with equal disadvantages."
(19) A prominent member of the government contracts bar says that
the Boards and Claims Court both offer resolution of claims in
"the same time," with "the same expense," and the same "generally
unsatisfactory" procedure. (20)
Those involved in Corps contract disputes are dissatisfied
with the current state of affairs. This report turns now to
further consider the problems with the conventional contract
claim system and the degree of satisfaction with ADR procedures
63
developed to respond to the problems.
Problems With Conventional Contract Dispute Resolution
As noted in the beginning of this chapter, my initial
expectation that Corps personnel are satisfied with current
contract dispute resolution procedures is not supported by my
findings. An important reason for the dissatisfaction is that the
District contracting officers too often do not resolve
disagreements that with contractors.
Several of my respondents criticized this early stage of the
contract dispute settlement process. one complaint is that the
COs do not hear the contractor's perspective prior to issuing the
decision. A Corps official acknowledged what might be a critical
flaw in current procedures, the absense of early face to face
discussions between representatives of the parties to the
dispute; the government and the contractor.
Some COs haven't been fully exposing themselves to the
contractor's side of the issue. They don't meet with the
contractor. Contractors have complained that the CO
decision was written without their side ever being heard.
They thought they could have gotten resolution if they had
an opportunity to present their side. I believe the CO has
an obligation to hear the other side.
This problem might arise as a contractor performs almost any
sort of government contract. For example, a contractor building
a complex of Army barracks substitutes high grade plastic
plumbing fixtures for the porcelain variety specified in the
contract after his original supplier notifies him that labor
trouble will delay delivery of the toilets well beyond the
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project completion date. The contractor makes the substitution
believing that the new fixtures are within the specifications of
contract. During a routine review of several completed
buildings, the Corps' project engineer notices the plastic bowls.
He immediately informs the contractor's project manager that the
fixtures do not meet the specifications and will have to be torn
out and replaced with the porcelain variety. The project manager
explains that the fixtures are adequate for the job and that
waiting for the original order will cause a several month delay
and financial penalization of the contractor for late
performance. They argue but do not resolve the issue. The
project engineer leaves, believing that the contractor is trying
to squeeze extra profit by the substitution. The engineer also
suspects that the plastic fixtures will not be as durable. He
informs the contracting officer of the situation. The CO reviews
the contract which does not specify the material that the
fixtures must be made. He is disturbed, though, that the
contrator did not clear the change with the project engineer or
any other Corps official. After conferring with district
counsel, he issues a decision penalizing the contractor under the
liquidated damages clause of the contract.
Meanwhile, the project manager relates the story to his
employer, the contractor, who calls the Corps' district office to
make an appointment with the CO. The contractor is informed that
the CO has just issued his decision and that it is on the way to
the contractor via registered mail. The contractor and counsel
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meet with the CO but no progress is made so the contractor's
lawyer files an appeal with the Corps of Engineers Board of
Contract Appeals. Poor communication and the availability of the
administrative appeal system result in another case added to the
BCA docket.
If COs commonly neglect to discuss the claim with the
contractor prior to issuing a decison, it is not surprising that
many CO decisions are appealed to a judicialized board (which
protects the contractor's opportunity to be heard.) With
thousands, or millions of dollars at stake in a single claim,
contractors are justifiably concerned with procedural due
process.
Other respondents mentioned the "fear of scruitiny" by the
Inspector General or congressional offices as discouraging COs
from risking close calls or making what might turn out to be
politically sensitive settlement decisions. For example, if a CO
grants a request for a million dollar supplemental payment under
a ten million dollar construction contract, a congressional
critic of military spending might open hearings to judge whether
the army is "giving away the store" to the multinational
construction company. This concern with adverse publicity and
potentially embarrasing review might lead a CO to deny the claim
even if it appears to be justified. After all, a plausible CO
denial, issued in the name of protecting the public treasury, is
not going to cause the CO great embarrasment even if overturned
by the COEBCA three years down the road. (21)
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There are psychological and sociological aspects to the way
contract dispute are currently handled. One attorney in the
Chief Counsel's office stressed what he called a "cultural"
element as a partial explanation for the large number of contract
disputes that are not settled by the CO or others at the district
level.
The CO and others in the engineering and counsel staff,
take an early position. Then they see their position as
right and the contractors as wrong, virtually to the point
of defending their honor. This happens very early. Then
things procede in a formalistic and legalistic way. Once
people have taken a stand, there is no process for
overcoming [their inclination to stay with that position.]
They put their feet in concrete too soon.
Contracting officers have the power to settle but often
choose to not exercise that power. A newsletter of government
contracting reported on this phenomenon in its review of a
meeting of professionals in the field:
members of the audience expressed the view that COs
frequently do not fulfill their responsibilities of
settling disputes but rather make a final decision as a
means of passing the problem up to the board of contract
appeals for decision. (22)
The Administrative Conference of the U.S. in its 1988 report
on government contract appeals discusses the "[i]ncreasing
incidence of contract controversies that remain unresolved
between the parties." (Crowell, 1988) The report notes "a reduced
willingness or ability to exercise responsibility by contracting
officials, and increased doubt in some quarters that they truly
act to serve the government's best interest." While agency
boards, procedures and caseloads vary:
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the unhappiness among many contractors, lawyers, and
agency officials is based upon accurate perceptions that
these disputes often are unnecessarily contentious and
their resolution needlessly complex and drawn out and,
therefore, very costly to both sides. (Ibid)
Most cases which are not settled at the District-level of the
Corps are appealed by the contractor to the Army Corps of
Engineers Board of Contract Appeals. (23) My respondents report
that a small portion of claims are settled in the field offices
when a contractor informally appeals to the CO's superiors.
Unfortunately, the Corps does not collect statistics on district
settlement of contract disagreements. Whatever the frequency of
settlement between the parties at the District, and between the
attorneys prior to Board decision, my respondents agree that
there is a need for change in the way the Corps handles its
contract disputes. Most see ADR as the right way to bring about
the needed change. Even my Corps repsondent most supportive of
the current procedures said that he "agreed somewhat" that the
Corps should expand its use of ADR for contract claims. Two
thirds of the questionnaire respondents "strongly agree" that the
Corps should use ADR for contract claims more often than it is
now. No one disagreed.
All the evidence and the weight of informal opinion suggest
there is a low level of satisfaction with the established
contract dispute resolution procedures and a strong interest in
an alternative approach. Some respondents want to change the
adversarial "culture" that has evolved in the field offices.
This, however, is a long range objective. In the immediate term,
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the use of ADR supplements for contract disputes is seen as the
best way to enhance the established procedures.
Satisfaction With ADR For Contract Disputes
I have found strongly positive attitudes towards the use of
ADR for contract claims. Most of the Corps' experience with ADR
for contract claims has been with the minitrial and non-binding
arbitration procedures. As noted above, 10/12 of the
questionnaire respondents agreed that "the Corps should expand
its use of ADR [for] contract claims." Most agreed strongly.
The only two respondent who did not agree, marked "don't know."
There was stronger support for expanded use of ADR for contract
claims then for any other application.
The Corps of Engineer Chief Counsel's Office began the
contract dispute ADR program in the fall of 1984. (24) Lester
Edelman, Chief Counsel, assigned two of his staff to organize the
effort: Frank Carr, Chief Trial Attorney and Sabrina Simon, Trial
Attorney. Carr identifies three sources of dissatisfaction with
the conventional contract dispute resolution procedures which
cause the Corps (and other government agencies) to consider ADR:
the costs of litigation; delays in obtaining decisions from the
Boards of Contract Appeals and the U.S. Claims Court; and the
disruptions to management in defending litigation. (Carr, 1988)
The Corps headquarters attorneys drafted a minitrial procedure
after reviewing how minitrials had been used in the private
sector and in the single public agency experience with a
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minitrial. (25) NASA was the first federal agency to use the
minitrial. A multi-million dollar contract dispute between the
agency and TRW was settled with the ADR procedure in 1982.
(Johnson, Masri and Oliver, 1982) Headquarters counsel then held
a three day meeting with selected District and Division counsel
to revise the procedure. (26) Chief Counsel subsequently
circulated recommended minitrial procedures to the District and
Division offices around the country. (27) The procedures are not
rigid, headquarters encourages the field offices to tailor the
minitrial according to the dispute.
The Corps defines minitrial as "a voluntary, expedited, and
nonjudicial procedure whereby top management officials for each
party meet to resolve disputes." (28) The term "minitrial" is a
misnomer. Rather than a "shortened, adversarial judicial
proceeding" that the term implies, a minitrial is a sturctured
negotiation process that blends elements of traditional
negotiation, mediation and arbitration. (29)
The essense of the minitrial technique is a short
presentation by each party of the key elements of its case to
management officials of the parties who have the power to settle
the case (the "principals".) The principals should have the
general technical expertise to understand the problems underlying
the dispute. Following the presentation, and any questions or
discussion of the facts and issues, the principals meet to
negotiate a settlement. The presentations typically involve the
extensive use of expert witnesses. The informality of the
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minitrial facilitates the flow of information from the experts
and lawyers to management officials (attorneys usually make the
presentations although technical staff have filled that role in
at least one case.) The formal rules of evidence are not applied
and cross examination is limited. Witnesses are allowed to
present their testimony in narrative form. Each party is
permitted to present its argument uninterrupted by the other
side. The principals may interject with their questions at any
time.
After the hearing, which may take a day or several days in a
very complicated case, the principals meet to negotiate a
settlement. In some of the minitrials, the principals met
intermittently during the hearing to determine what additional
information they needed prior to negotiations. One of the
advantages of the process is that the principals do not have to
agree on all points to achieve settlement. (30) After the areas
of disagreement are identified and narrowed, the negotiations can
focus on the dollar settlement. If the principals are unable to
settle the case, the formal appeal to the Board of Contract
Appeals of to the U.S. Claims Court may proceed. However, the
content of the minitrial may not be used in the litigation. No
transcript of the hearing or negotiations is produced and neither
party may use what is said by the opponent in the hearing as
evidence of an admission in subsequent litigation. The agreement
to conduct the minitrial is strictly voluntary. Either party may
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withdraw at any time without prejudicing its position in
litigation.
An interesting element of the minitrial is the use of a
neutral advisor to assist the principals in assessing the merits
of the claim. If the parties decide to use a neutral advisor,
the advisor's role is clarified in a written minitrial agreement,
which specifies all the pre-hearing and hearing procedures and
schedules. Like other aspects of the minitrial, the parties have
considerable flexibility in fashioning the role of the advisor.
The parties to'the Corps minitrials which used a neutral advisor
have hired law professors or judges experienced in government
contracting. The advisor can preside over the hearing although
this may be a minimal role, due to the informal process. Often,
the parties want the neutral advisor to share his or her
expertise by probing the critical issues during the hearing. (31)
They may also assign the advisor the repsonsibility of providing
an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the two
positions. The advisor has, in some cases served as a mediator
between the principals by meeting privately with each of them to
ascertain their positions and communicate them to the other side.
(32)
The Corps has settled nine cases using ADR procedures. Six
used minitrials, and three were with a non-binding arbitration
procedure. The nonbinding arbitration has not been the focus of
as much attention as the minitrial in the Corps or in government
contracting circles generally. Compared to what they knew about
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the minitrial procedure, my respondents were less knowlegable
about non-binding arbitration and the Disputes Resolution Panel
recently established by the Corps, but not yet utilized. I have
chosen to focus this report on the minitrial efforts in the
Corps. (33) A seventh minitried case was concluded with an
agreement in early May, 1988 but had not been finalized at the
time of this report.
The Corps' minitrial experiment has recieved much attention
inside the Corps and more generally in government contracting
circles. (34) Notwithstading this support, however, the
minitrial experiment has its detractors. In particular,
technical staff in the field offices have reportedly criticized
the procedure in at least one high-profile case. The focus of
criticism is that minitrials conducted with Division mangement as
the government principal, do not take advantage of the technical
and contracting expertise of the District. The lack of expertise
and the desire to resolve the case, may lead to settlements that
are not in the best interest of the government. The question of
what level of the organization is most appropriate for contract
claim ADR procedures is discussed later in this chapter.
In the questionnaire, I asked whether "Corps personnel are
opposed to greater use of ADR because of the disappointing
results, to date." Six of the twelve questionnaire respondents
disagreed, one agreed strongly with the statement and five
answered "don't know" or were neutral. This reflects lack of
consensus at OCE (headquarters), where most of my respondents
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work, as to the attitude of field personnel regarding
satisfaction with the minitrial.
My respondents, from the Corps and the private sector, are
strongly supportive of the Corps' use of ADR for contract claims.
Next, this report turns to the Tennessee-Tom Bigbee minitrial,
the most controversial contract ADR case, to date.
Tennessee-Tom Bigbee Minitrial. Of the nine contract disputes
the Corps had settled using ADR procedures, one has caused the
greatest controversy. (35) The dispute arose out of the
construction of the Tennessee Tombigbee Waterway an eleven mile
navigational connection the Corps built between the Tennessee and
the Tombigbee rivers.
In March 1979 the Nashville, Tennessee district of the Corps
of Engineers entered into a contract with a joint venture known
as Tennessee-Tom Contractors. (36) The primary work under this
contract was the excavation of of 95 million cubic yards of earth
to construct a waterway between the Tennesse River and the
Tombigbee River. The joint venture was the successful bidder and
received a fixed price contract for $270.6 million.
The bid soliciation package issued by the Nashville district
included the results of geologic tests made to predict the
conditions that the contractor would encounter. One of the test
results incorporated in the bid solicitation package was from a
sample excavation of a 1,500 foot wide section in the area where
the contract work would be performed. This data would emerge as
central to the dispute.
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Soon after beginning the excavation work, the contractors
realized something was wrong. The ground wasn't responding as
represented in the bid document. It was much more resistant to
the bulldozers and other heavy equipment than anticipated. The
greater rolling resistance caused equipment to break down,
resulting in higher maintanance costs. The contractor began to
monitor and document the problem with written reports and
videotapes of the work underway and the conditions encountered.
Tenn-Tom contractors formally notified the Corps of the
"differing site condition" problem in August 1980 and again in
April 1981. The contractors submitted several claims during this
period, asking for additional compensation to cover cost
increases they attributed to the difference between the actual
soil conditions and what was described in the bid solicitation.
The last of these claims was for $42.8 million.
The Nashville staff established a task force to study the
problem and hired consultants to further evaluate the merit of
the differing site condition allegation. Notwithstanding good
on-site rapport between the Nashville and Tenn-Tom management
teams, the respective organizations differed on their view of the
claim for equitable adjustment to the contract. In August, 1984
the District office issued a contracting officer's decision
denying the claim. The Contract Disputes Act allows 90 days for
appeal to the Board of Contract Appeals. Tennessee-Tom
Contractors filed their appeal with the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Board of Contract Appeals (COEBCA) in October 1984.
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When the contractors filed their appeal to the COEBCA, they
knew it might be years before the Board would hear the case. The
COEBCA was in the midst of a (still continuing) trend of a
steadily growing docket. This claim was not eligible for the
Board's Rule 12 accelerated procedures since the amount at issue
was over $50,000. (37) The average nonexpedited case before the
various boards of contract appeals takes two to three years from
the date of filing to date of decision. In a complex case it is
not unusual for three to four years to elapse before the board
issues a decision. (Edelman and Carr, 1987) Thus, when outside
counsel, Stan Johnson, suggested to his client the idea of an
alternative forum for resolving the claim, the joint venture was
receptive.
Johnson was counsel for TRW in the 1982 minitrial with NASA,
the first reported use of the procedure by a federal agency.
That multi-million dollar dispute, dealing with a technically
complex satellite tracking and data relay system, had been well
into discovery by the time the minitrial was held. The pleadings
were filed in late 1979 and early 1980, followed by the kind of
massive discovery which is typical of complex litigation. By
September 1981, the parties collected over 100,000 pages of one
another's files and several thousand pages of deposition
transcripts. Concerned with the rising costs of the litigation
and continuing delays in the scheduled hearing date, the parties
decided to attempt settlement with the minitrial process. They
agreed on minitrial procedures and to stay the litigation. If no
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settlement were reached, the litigation would resume. A one day
hearing and two days of face-to-face negotiations culminated in
settlement of the claim as well as other outstanding disputes.
The total settlement was over $100 million.
Because of his experience with the NASA-TRW minitrial,
Johnson was "favorably disposed to the process as a way to serve
my client effeciently." Thus, when he read in a construction
engineering periodical that the Corps' Chief counsel had launched
a minitrial program, he thought of nominating the Tenn-Tom case.
The parties had been unable to settle at the CO level, there was
at least $45 million at stake and Johnson knew his client was
willing to compromise.
The willingness to compromise is a key element in determining
whether a case is amenable to ADR resolution. If one party is
already unwilling to engage in the give and take of bargaining, a
minitrial and susequent negotiation sessions are liable to be a
waste of time. An exception would be if the resistant party is
unrealistically confident of a legal victory because of a wholly
inacurate assessment of the strength of their legal position. In
such a case, the information surfaced in the minitrial might
cause them to realize the likelihood that they would loose at
trial, thereby creating a willingness to compromise.
Johnson's client was interested in pursuing the minitrial
even though they believed their case was strong. Jack Lemley,
Vice-President for Morrison-Knudson told me that his company
"immediately viewed the idea as positive. If we could short-cut
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the litigation, that's good." The joint venture was willing to
compromise even though they believed they had a strong case. If
fact, Lemley told me that "We had no concern about winning. We
knew we would ultimately win. This was the cleanist differing
site condition claim I've seen in thirty years." The contractors
were confident because they had thoroughly documented the
difference between the soil conditions predicted by the
government and those encountered on site. There were no
unsettled legal principles to raise doubts about liability. If
Tenn-Tom could demonstrate that the conditions encountered by the
contractor differed materially from those represented in the the
bid document, they would recover. Why then were they willing to
compromise? "Because of the time and expense of litigation"
according to Lemley. Another reason for attempting settlement is
even if Tenn-Tom demonstrated a changed condition, they would
still have the burden of quantifying the damages. Such a
determination requires a lot of data and is open to
interpretation.
The Nashville District is a subordinate command to the Ohio
River Division of the Corps. The Tenn-Tom case was being handled
by Wesley Jockisch, Ohio River Division (ORD) Counsel. ORD was
already aware of the contract claims ADR initiative, having
attended the meeting on the subject held by Chief Counsel in
1984. Jockisch and the Division Commander, Brigadier General
Peter Offringa were receptive to the minitrial approach. Jockisch
also believed that he had "a very strong case," and would have
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tried the case without hesitation if it hadn't settled. He noted
that the central issue of whether there was a differing condition
came down to a yes or no answer. There is "no way to say there
was a partially changed condition." He saw the results of a
Board trial as less certain than did Lemley. Jockisch explained
that each side had "experts with fine credentials" and "equally
good position papers." His view was that "neither side felt 100%
certain of winning [at the Board] though both were interested in
an earlier resolution than the extablished procedure would
provide.
ORD and Tenn-Tom contractors agreed in April 1985 to attempt
to resolve the claim with a minitrial. Richard Solibakke, the
COEBCA Chairman who was assigned to the case was "delighted to
allow the minitrial." He has emphsized his support of various ADR
initiatives to help deal with the backlog and delay problem.
Sollibake's view is that "No BCA has a vested interest in hanging
on to its cases; you don't have to worry about hurting our
feelings." ORD Commander Peter Offringa was designated as the
government's principal and the contractors chose Morrison-Knudsen
vice president Jack Lemley as their representative. The parties
agreed to locate a neutral advisor to assist the principals and
to split the cost of compensting that person. They believed that
an advisor with expertise in government contracting could help
the principals assess the cases as presented by the attorneys,
nkeep the focus on the relevant issues and assist in the
settlement negotiations. Lemley sees that "it is imperitive to
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have a neutral advisor who has a good deal of expeience with
federal procurement law, and the law generally." Johnson
underscored the importance of the neutral advisor as helping the
parties define the appropriate bases for decision. He said "the
neutral advisor contributes to the opportunity for rational
settlement." Jockisch agreed that a neutral advisor is essential
for the minitrial procedure to help the parties in sort the
issues and to facilitate the subsequent negotiations. He
believes in the value of the outside unbiased expert to the
extent that "I would not agree to a mintrial without a neutral
advisor." For this minitrial, the parties retained George
Washington Unversity Law Professor, Ralph Nash.
Professor Nash spoke with the principals as they were
planning the minitrial. He and General Offringa agreed to
Lemley's suggestion that they meet for dinner the night before
the minitrial was to begin. This meeting helped to establish a
rapport between the three men who would be presiding over the
hearing and engaging in settlement negotiations.
The minitrial was held in Cincinnati, Ohio on June 12 - 14,
1985. Prior to that date, all interested parties agrees that any
final settlement arrived at in the minitrial would include all
subcontractor claims. The parties presented their cases on
consecutive days, with a third day devoted to presentation of
evidence concerning quantum (the amount due, if liability is
established) and for remaining questions. Nash, at the request
of the principals, fully participated throughout the process,
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including asking questions of the attorneys and their experts.
He briefed the principals on the legal issues and offered his
analysis during the hearings and negotiations. One of his roles
was to challange the attorneys to back up their assertions. Nash
explained in reference to Tenn-Tom and another minitrial for
which he was a neutral advisor:
the fact that questions were asked by me - as a neutral
advisor - protected the principal from the adverse side
from having to ask the question and risk losing the
appearance of impartiality which would later be helpful in
arriving at a settlement. This is not to say that the
principals are actually impartial but, rather, that they
lose some of their ability to negotiate if they regularly
attack the witnesses for the other party.
After the hearings, the principals met to negotiate. Nash
was present. He reports that one of the principals was "very
nervous" and unwilling to settle at that point. Nash was not
convinved that more information, as such, would help them reach
an agreement but he saw that the principal needed the process to
continue before he would be ready to settle. "In every minitrial
I've done, at least one of the principals has been skitish. This
cautiousness is understandable given the newness of the procedure
and the large sums invovled. Nash handled the situation in this
case by "contructing an expedient to keep him in." They decided
to hold an additional hearing to give the contractor an
opportunity to put in more information regarding conditions
encountered during a certain time period.
According to Stan Johnson, he and opposing counsel Wes
Jockisch "were resistant when the principals asked for more
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minitrial." Johnson reported that "I felt like I'd been invited
to a dance and nobody would dance with me." He speculates that
the hesitant principal needed more time to accept the idea of
settling based on the risk of losing a Board trial.
In the renewed hearing, on June 27, 1985, the parties agreed
to Nash's suggestion that they organize the expert testimony
differently. Instead of one expert answering a series of
questions at a time, the experts were put up as witnesses
simultaneously. One witness would answer a question on a point
of controversy and then the other was asked to respond. The
first witness then responded to the second and so forth. This
process successfully narrowed the differences between the
witnessess and thus between the positions of the parties.
Negotiations resumed after the second round of hearings and
the principals reached agreement. The $55.6 million claim was
resolved for $17.2 In my interviews with the two attorneys and
one of the principals, all were satisfied with the agreement.
The other principal, General Offringa, who I was not able to
interview, indicated his satisfaction indirectly, through his
responses to the questionnaire. He agreed that the Corps should
use ADR more often and in particular should expand its use of ADR
for contract claims. He elaborted, in the questionnaire space
for respondent comments that "I am, through experience and
inclination, a strong supporter of ADR."
Jockisch explained that the Corps attorneys from the district
were also pleased with the minitrial. However, the technical
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staff did not share in the support for the procedure and
resulting settlement. A district technical staff member called
the Department of Defense Inspector General Hotline to
anonymously complain that the settlement was not justified. This
person's view, which some of my respondents believe is widespread
among the technical staff, is that the General "gave away the
store." The technical staff who opposed the Tenn-Tom outcome
believe that in the zeal to reach a resolution, an ill-advised
settlement was made.
After an investigation, the Inspector General (IG) found that
the resolution was "in the best interest of the government"
because "the Government had sufficient liability to justify a
$17.25 million settlement." The IG report supported the minitrial
procedure more generally, as well. It concluded that "the mini-
trial procedure, in certain cases, is an efficient and cost-
effective means for settling contract disputes." The single
criticism in the report was that the Corps did not adequately
document how the "settlement amount was reached and the basis on
which it was allocated to the contractor." This is an important
criticism. If settlements (reached by any means) are going to
withstand the review of oversight offices, the press and the
public, adequate documentation of the reasons for the particular
agreement must be prepared. This serves as a check on the
negotiators and also provides information useful to later compare
the results of various settlement techniques.
Three of my respondents who support ADR procudres for
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contract claims emphasized the "momentum for settlement" created
when the parties agree to conduct a minitrial. Stan Johnson,
Tenn-Tom's attorney called this momentum the "most important"
aspect of the minitrial. "People set their sights on settlement,
put an effort into it, and they don't want it to fail." While
these respondents see momentum as a positive force, it might
pressure a principal to settle a case that should not be settled.
However, this does not indict the procedure. Rather, it suggests
that the parties must carefully review each case considered for
ADR to determine if it is an appropriate candidate. The
assessment is familiar to any attorney considering settlement
strategy. Factors that go into the determination include: the
likely outcome of each procedure for resolution under
consideration, and the costs of each proceudre including the
affect on relationships between the parties and the ancillary
effects of each procedure (e.g. precedant, public impact.)
Conclusion Regarding Satisfaction
My initial expectations regarding my respondents satisfaction
with contract dispute resolution procedures are not supported by
the evidence collected in this study. I assumed that Corps
personnel are satisfied with current procedures for resolving
contract disputes and that they are dissatisfied with the
agency's experience with ADR, to date. Interviews with key Corps
employees and observers knowledgeable about government
contracting indicate that there is strong dissatisfaction with
the agency's conventional approaches to contract dispute
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resolution. Disagreements between the Corps and its contractors
are often not resolved by the contracting officer or other
District staff, and are instead appealed to a Board of Contract
Appeals or the U. S. Claims Court. Backlogs at Boards and Claims
Court are growing causing long delays and increased costs for the
government and its contractors. My respondents agree with the
consensus of the government contracting community that the system
is not working well.
I also expected that Corps personnel are dissappointed with
the results of the ADR, so far. My interviews and questionnaire
results do not support this assumption. To the contrary, there
is strong evidence that the ADR experiment is viewed positively
by key Corps personnel and the contracting community. However,
some respondents report that field staff have not yet accepted
the ADR program. They are reportedly concerned that minitrials
conducted at the Division-level of the Corps do not take
advantage of the District's expertise and may result in
settlements that do not adequately protect the government's
interests.
Satisfaction with current procedures does not appear to be a
barrier to greater use of ADR for contract disputes.
Dissappointment with Division-level minitrials may be a cause of
some resistance but more information is needed to measure the
importance of this concern.
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RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AS A LIMIT TO THE USE OF ADR FOR CONTRACT
CLAIMS
Without an adequate allocation of funds and staff time even
the most brilliant program initiatives will fall flat. More
likely still, an innovative approach to an old problem will be
difficult to implement if it requires or seems to require
resources already slated for other purposes. Staff can not be
expected to embrace program initiatives that require a
significant time investment if they already feel overburdened. It
is this last notion that caused me to assume that Corps personnel
oppose greater use of ADR because they believe it will increase
their workload.
My findings tentatively support this assumption. The limited
availability of Corps management for new activites, such as
serving as minitrial principals, has emerged as a concern of
those involved in the contract claim experiment.
I asked respondents whether they agreed that "ADR increases
the workload for management and staff." The questionnaire
responses were split on this question: three of them agreeing
somewhat, three strongly disagreeing and one disagreeing
somewhat. Four respondents gave a neutral response and there was
one "don't know." Interviews clarified that some who disagreed
thought ADR can conserve agency resources by bringing about a
more timely and efficient resolution of disputes. Hence,
respondents as a group were more in agreement with the assertion
that "greater use of ADR in the Corps may increase overall Corps
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efficiency." Two thirds (8/12) of the questionnaire respondents
agreed that ADR would probably lead to more efficiency; three
respondents disagreed and one was neutral. I will discuss the
efficiency question later in this section.
The Corps' Division Engineers are responsible for selecting
cases for minitrial according to the policy adopted in 1985. (38)
This initial Corps policy on minitrials, identifies the Division
Engineer as the appropriate principal to represent the
government. The contractor's principal is usually a senior
management official with settlement authority. Contractors often
designate vice presidents with responsibility for government
contract activities. The Corps' division engineers are generals
(39).
One of my respondents, who was Division counsel for 15 years,
described the expanding demands on a Division Commander's time
and the additional burden that a minitrial places on the
Commander.
ADR is time consuming. It is a major time commitment for
management. [In one mintrial it took] 2 weeks from the
general's scehdule. These folks [division engineers] are
very busy. They meet with state officials. They do a lot
of public relations. When you take a week out of [a
Division Engineer's] time, its a big commitment. Plus you
have to count the preparation time - taking briefing
books home. It used to be that the Division Commander was
heavily into the contracting function. But now he has so
many other functions. This has been a dramatic change in
the last 15 years. Its a shift in Corps programs. In the
60s we had little regulatory or environmental programs.
There wan't much in the way of hazardous waste or fish and
wildlife issues. Now the Corps has these expanded
responsibilities, but still only one Commander. Also the
staff has not expanded commensurate with the
responsibilties.
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Not only does a Division minitrial pressure the Division
Engineer, but his limited availability can affect the ease with
which minitrial logistics can be worked out. Corps counsel for
one of the minitrials told me that the general's limited
availability required rescheduling one session eleven times (40).
The answer may lie in modifying the procedure so that others
besides the division engineer serve as principal for the
government. As one respondent put it, "Until we get to the point
where we get more principals, there will be a constraint on the
number of minitrials we can do." The U.S. Administrative
Conference has made a similar observation about minitrials in
federal agencies:
Recognition that top management's time is at a premium
will be especially important if minitrials become more
common. Agencies can meet this concern by tailoring the
rank of the manager-principal to suit the magnitude of the
case, by encouraging use of ADR earlier in the case (e.g.,
the CO level), or by bringing in auditors or others
occasionally as principals. (Crowell, 1988)
The Corps has taken the steps to increase the availability of
principals by beginning to experiment with District-level
minitrials. Four of the five most recent minitrials were
conducted in Corps Districts with COs or District Engineers
serving as principals for the government. For example, the Corps'
Norfolk District arranged a minitrial with the W.G. Construction
Corporation to handle a dispute regarding their contract for the
construction of the Visitor's Center for the Morris Hill
Recreation Area in Gathright, Virginia. The minitrial was
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conducted at the District with the contracting officer as the
government's principal. Claims totalling $764,783.12 were
subsequently settled for $288,000.
Chief Counsel's office seems to have found an appropriate
balance between, on the one hand, offering guidance to the field
offices regarding how the minitrial and other ADR procedures can
be structured and, on the other, allowing the Districts and
Divisions to modify the procedure according to their views. This
approach permits the offices with available management resources
to take the lead in ADR experimentation within the Corps while
not forcing other offices, which believe they can not afford to
use the procedure, to try ADR against their will. This is
consistent with the Corps' historical OCE/field office
relationship. The regional offices have always been semi-
autonomous in many respects. (Mazmanian, 1979) The flexible
guidance approach of Chief Counsel has allowed the Districts to
volunteer to experiment with minitrials after the Corps gained
experience with the procedure at the Division level. Now the
trend may be with the Districts, which, among other benefits,
opens a much larger pool of principals and permits settlement
efforts to take place closer to where the dispute arose.
Holding minitrials at the District level of the Corps is one
way to increase the number of available government principals.
Another approach is to look to others besides top management to
represent the government for the ADR procedure. The government's
representative in contract negotiations must have authority to
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settle the claim if agreement is reached. In the Corps, that
authority, called a "contracting warrant" is normally vested in a
contracting officer in the district. However, for the purpose of
settlement, the contracting warrant for a particular contract can
be assigned on a temporary basis to any one of a number of
qualified COE employees in the district or divison. (41) The
Corps, by compiling a list of personnel eligible to recieve the
contracting warrent, can begin the process of expanding the pool
of contract ADR principals. Of course, other criteria must also
be applied to determine appropriate government representatives
for settlement negotiations.
Effective principals must be able to take an objective look
at the issues, and not feel bound by the positions taken by the
COs who denied the claims. They need to have the technical
expertise to quickly grasp the issues. The principal in a given
case must be comfortable making decisions about the amount at
issue and at ease dealing with the stature and style of the
company's representative. One way to handle these potentially
competing qualifications is to tailor the rank of the principal
to suit the magnitude of the case. (Crowell, 1988) For example,
the government principal for a $70,000 differing site condition
case could be a district technical staffperson while an army
general serving as Divison Engineer might be the most appropriate
principal for a multi-million dollar claim of precedential or
political import (42).
While my respondents suggested that COE personnel from
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various levels of the organization might appropriately serve as
contract ADR principals, sentiment is strong that the pool should
not include legal staff. One attorney views lawyers as an
impediment to settlement. Lawyers, he said, "are trained to win,
not to reach settlement. They are trained to put everything in
the bast light. They are trained, in a sense, to prevent
settlement." While this observation may accurately characterize
lawyers and legal education generally, it does not apply to all
members of the profession or all attorneys in the Corps. Corps
attorneys have successfully settled thousands of contract claims
over the years. A number of the attorneys in Chief Counsel's
office and some in the field offices are leading players in the
agency's move to ADR. Most of my Corps respondents are lawyers
and their comments throughout this report demonstrate a capacity
for self-criticism and an inclination to innovate. Yet
notwithstanding their own support of non-adversarial dispute
resolution, my attorney-respondents support a smaller role for
lawyers in the ADR process than lawyers currently play in the
conventional contract claim system.
Chief Counsel, Lester Edelman notes the irony that while
lawyers are "trained to have an insatiatble appetite for
information," when it comes to dealing with a conflict "we use
all our training to exclude information from the decisionmaker."
Perhaps lawyers will act differently if given the role of
principal but none of my respondents suggest that it be tried.
Edelman and his Chief Trial attorney, Frank Carr, wrote last year
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that minitrials will be more successful if "management decide the
dispute, rather than attorneys and judges, [thus enabling] the
parties to use management skills and policies to resolve a
dispute that is heavily fact-oriented." (Edelman and Carr, 1987)
This issue of who in the agency are the most effective
principals in minitrials will be better understood as the Corps
continue to experiment with different procedures, roles and
organizational locations for contract claim ADR. It is clear,
though, that limited management time now constrains the expansion
of minitrials conducted at the COE's division level.
The limited time of Division Engineers is a barrier to
greater use of ADR for resolving contract disputes. The Corps has
already begun to address this constraint by experimenting with
minitrials and non-binding arbitration in the Districts. If more
ADR settlements are reached with District Engineers and
contracting officers serving as government principals, as has
already occurred on a small scale, than the limited availability
of Division management will no longer constrain the further use
of ADR.
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ORGANIZATIONAL LEVELS FOR CONTRACT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE
"OVERRULING PROBLEM"
Overview
At the outset of this research I expected to find several
barriers to greater use of ADR flowing from the relationships
among the different levels of the organization and between the
organization and oversight offices. Specifically, I assumed that
management and staff would oppose ADR procedures resulting in
management overruling decisions of their subordinates. Overruling
of District contract claims decisions occurs, for example, when a
Division Engineer, sitting as principal in a minitrial rejects a
contracting officer's decision on a claim and negotiates a
settlement with the contractor. My findings do not clearly
support or disprove this expectation.
I also assumed that Corps personnel oppose ADR procedures
which empower Division management to resolve disputes which the
personnel believe could be handled better by District-level
employees. Like the first assumption, this expectation is related
to the early contract claim minitrial procedures which were held
at Corps Divisions. My findings neither support nor disprove this
expectation.
Finally, I expected that Corps personnel oppose greater use
of ADR for contract claims because they think that engaging in
experimental procedures will increase the risk of critical review
from oversight offices such as the Department of Defense
Inspector General. This assumption was not supported by the
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evidence. Surprisingly, I found that concern about oversight
instead, may be one of the causes of the low level of
conventional contract disagreement settlement.
The Corps of Engineers is a multilevel organization. Some
conflicts, must be addressed at the OCE (headquarters) level,
such as a disagreement with U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service over
how the respective agencies should interpret their Clean Water
Act Section 404 responsibilities. Other kinds of disputes are
most appropriately resolved by a field office. For example, a
debate between sports fishermen who want the Corps to maintain
the water level in a reservoir and white water kayakers who want
more outflow is probably better addressed by the District office
then by the Corps' Washington, D.C. staff. Many types of
conflict, however can be addressed at various levels of the
organization. A review of how the Corps can better manage its
disagreements should include some consideration of where, within
the organization, various kinds of conflict should be handled.
This discussion focuses on resolution of contract claims. A
similar sort of analysis would be useful for other kinds of
conflict.
As described earlier in this chapter, a contracting officer
(CO) is responsible for entering into and administering any Corps
contract. A claim arising out of the contract must be presented
to the CO. If not satisfied with the CO's decision, the
contractor can appeal to the appropriate Board of Contract
Appeals or to the U.S. Claims Court. Before or after filing a
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formal appeal, the contractor may informally contact the CO's
superiors in the District or Division office in an effort to
settle the disagreement.
The Corps resolves disputes with its contractors in different
ways and at different levels of the organization from the
District CO to the Division Commander to the COE Board of
Contract Appeals. At the District level, informal negotiations
settle most disagreements. Typically, a Corps project engineer
oversees a construction job for the government. The contractor on
the project will have its own supervisor. As problems arise, the
contractor's representative will try to work it out with the
Corps' project engineer. The Corps project engineer is authorized
as the CO's representative and can alter the contract up to a
specified amount. The CO will get involved if the two on-site
supervisors are unable to handle the problem or if a large sum is
at issue. The CO may resolve the problem with the contractor and
not have to issue a formal ruling. However, if the CO and the
contractor do not agree, the CO will issue his or her adverse
ruling in writing. If the contractor chooses to appeal, the
Corps' attorneys get involved. Depending on the size of the
claim and the procedures of the Division, either a District or a
Division attorney will represent the government. (43) A small
number of disagreements with contractors are settled when a
Division or District Commander responds to a request from the
contractor. This is an unusual situation as Commanders generally
support the decisions of their COs.
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Settlement can also result from attorneys for the Corps and
contractor negotiate a resolution after the appeal has been
docketed at the Board. For example, a bakery is financially
penalized for making a late delivery of supplies on a food
service contract. The CO, who has had problems with this bakery
in the past, decides to punish the supplier by ordering the
maximum damages allowed under the liquidated damages clause of
the contract. The bakery requests the CO to reconsider,
explaining the it has had recurring labor problems only recently
resolved with a new agreement with its union. The request is
denied and the bakery appeals to the Corps of Engineers Board of
Contract Appeals. The district attorney recognizes the settlement
potential and is eager to reduce her own slate of BCA cases. She
contacts the contractor's attorney and they work out an agreement
whereby the penalty will be reduced by 50%. The bakery pledges to
make greater efforts to meet its delivery schedule and to arrange
for an alternate supply if it is unable to deliver on time.
Even without hard statistics, it can be safely said that the
large majority of problems with contractors are resolved without
resort to formal administrative or legal procedures. Nonetheless,
as discussed earlier in this chapter, an increasing number of
contract disputes are moving up the chain to the Boards of
Contract Appeals and to the U.S. Claims Court. Dissatisfaction
with current procedures is widespread. Ten out of twelve of my
questionnaire respondents agreed that the Corps should expand its
use of ADR for contract claims. In interviews, several of my
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respondents explained that communication between representatives
of the government and contractors often breaks down early in the
development of the disagreement and the parties remain estranged
even when the representatives change. A trade journal reports the
view of some in the industry that
COs frequently do not fulfill their responsibility of
settling disputes but rather make a final decision as a
means of passing the problem up to the Board of Contract
Appeals for decision (44).
Opportunities for informal resolution are missed and the case
is handed off to the judicialized administrative process. For
example, in a typical scenario, the Corps hires a contractor for
major improvements to an army base. (45) The prime contractor
(prime) hires a subcontractor (sub), on January 1, to fabricate a
steel fuel oil tank according to specifications The iqb got the
job by submitting the lowest bid. The Corps needs the tanks
installed by December 1 so that the next phase of work can begin
promptly. It generally takes ten months to fabricate such a
specialized tank and one month to transport and install it. To
save some money, the sub decides to fabricate the tank in
sections and assemble it on-site. In late October, the sub ships
the tank in three parts. The pieces arrive at the base on
November 10th. A government inspector notices the activity as the
sub is beginning the assembly. He tells the prime contractor's
manager that the Corps contracted for a tank made of continuous
steel and will not accept the tank assembled from pieces.
The prime calls the District office and points out that the
contract specifications require a certain thickness and grade of
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galvanized steel but does not refer to the form of construction.
The Corps' project engineer points out that the contract
incorporates by reference the industry standard for such tanks
which is for continuous steel. The sub wants to assemble the tank
since the final delivery date is approaching, but the Corps
project engineer orders the crew off the base.
The prime contractor will be charged liquidated damages on a
daily basis if the tank not installed on time. The prime can send
the sub back to the factory to build a tank of continuous steel
or seek out a new supplier. The sub informs the contractor that
it has just built a tank at the plant that meets the
specifications but it was special ordered by another customer.
The sub agrees to send the tank to the Army base and it arrivesn,
on December 8th, one week past the delivery deadline. Because of
a mix-up, the base military police have not been authorized by
Corps officials to admit the tank or the installation crew, and
it is several more days before that is straightened out.
The sub has incurred increased costs from 1)the second,
unscheduled, rush delivery, 2)storing the second tank during the
time when the sub was not authorized to re-enter the base
3)building the three piece tank that is not readily saleable, and
4)finding its other customer a replacement tank. The sub charges
the prime contractor for all these costs. The prime, on advice of
counsel, pays the sub and seeks reimbursement from the government
under the claims clause of the contract. The contractor asserts,
among other things, that the requirement of a continuous steel
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tank was a change in the contract justifying increased
compensation. The Corps' project engineer makes an initial denial
of the claim and charges the contractor for late delivery of the
tank.
The project engineer forwards the claim to the District
office for review by the technical engineers. The technical staff
see that the tank specification issue could have been decided
either way but after discussions with the project engineer they
decide to support his initial position. The claim is forwarded to
District counsel who says that while the case is not legally
clear-cut, there is enough support for the government's position
to defend against the claim at the Board. The Chief of the
District's Construction Division is briefed and calls the
contractor to notify that the claim is denied. He informs the
contractor of the right to meet with the contracting officer
(CO.) The contractor requests the meeting. The CO has not yet
been directly involved with the dispute. He is, however, aware of
the problem from informal conversation around the office and is
inclined to agree with his colleagues.
The CO listens to the contractor's story and asks some
questions. He promises to have an answer on the contractor's
appeal within 48 hours. He then meets with the technical staff
and after a review of the facts, confirms that he agrees with the
government's position. District counsel drafts the formal denial
of the claim and the CO signs it. The denial is sent by certified
mail, return receipt requested, to document the date of
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notification of the denial. The contractor now has 90 days to
file an appeal before the Board of Contract Appeals (or a year to
file at the U.S. Claims Court.) The contractor can informally
request a reconsideration or review from senior District or
Division officials but as one of my attorney respondents put it
"the wheels move too slowly for reconsideration to happen within
90 days." More likely, the contractor's lawyer files the appeal
with the Board.
After the claim is docketed at the Board of Contract Appeals
many months or even years can pass before the dispute is closely
reconsidered by the attorneys. The lawyers on both sides know
that there will be a long wait and will work on other projects
that demand immediate attention. The dicovPry nroceP will
slowly gear up, with depositions, interrogatories and requests
for various, often voluminous, documents. As the trial date
approaches, the attorneys will take a closer look at the case. At
that time, the attorneys may or may not have before them all the
relevant facts, though the discovery process is designed to
elicit as much information as possible. In this hypothetical, 18
months have passed since the appeal was filed and the trial date
before the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals is 6
months away. According to this Division's procedure, Division
counsel is handling the defense. Counsel has all the documents
gathered by District counsel and the transcripts and copies of
additional documents secured from the contractor through
discovery. The Corps' project engineer for the case is recently
100
deceased. Counsel pieces together the story by skimming the file
and talking to the CO and District counsel over the phone. The
Division attorney and the contractor's lawyer meet to discuss the
case but can not find much room for a settlement. Both are
adamant about the validity of their client's position and neither
is under pressure to settle. So, the case goes to the Board.
Two years after docketing, the Board hears the claim but is
likely to not settle the disagreement altogether. According to a
judge of the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals, 95% of
Board decisions are on entitlement rather than quantum. (46) The
Board decides whether the contractor is entitled to receive money
for the various aspects of the claim. It is left to the partt'es
to negotiate and settle- the actual dollar amounts. Tf the
parties, through their counsel, are unable to reach agreement on
quantum, they may return to the judge. Either side may appeal the
Board decisions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.
Disputes of this sort begin at the Corps District where the
contract was performed and all too often move up and away from
that location and from the original players. This, despite the
fact that as one observer put it "The system is set up for
settlement... It is set up as a claims avoidance system... The only
time we have a claim is when the administrative system breaks
down." It seems that the system is breaking down on a regular
basis.
Chief Counsel, Lester Edelman and his staff are among those
seeking improvements. Since contract disputes can be resolved in
a number of organizational locales, one question they are
considering is where in the Corps emphasis on settlement should
be made. They are encouraging stronger settlement efforts,
earlier in the dispute and lower in the organization. This seems
a wise approach. Information is lost when a dispute is placed on
the back burner as it moves up the system. The essence of the
disagreement can be blurred by the mass of documents gathered in
the effort to assemble the data needed to try the case. The
original parties to the conflict lose control of the dispute as
the lawyers take over. The attorneys, who are trained in
adversarial conflict resolution, may not recognize and take
advantage of opportunities to settle the disagreement. Meanwhile
expenses mount for both sides as the litigation process
continues. In some cases, the relationship between the government
and the contractor may deteriorate as outstanding claims remain
unresolved.
It is appropriate then, that the Corps is seeking through its
ADR experiment to resolve disputes in a non-adversarial setting,
earlier in time and a recent modification of the minitrial,
closer to the source of the original disagreement.
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Resistance to Contract Claim ADR Procedures in which
Management Overrules Staff
The question of where within the structure of the Corps,
settlement efforts should occur is affected, of course, by
relationships among the different offices of the organization.
Two of my initial assumptions deal with this issue. The first is
about Corps employees' attitudes regarding minitrials in which
management may overturn the CO's contract claim decision. I
expected that Corps personnel would resist the use of minitrials
and other ADR procedures because they do not want to support a
procedure in which Corps management may reject the positions
taken by their staff.
Results of my interviews and questionnaires do not provide
clear evidence to prove or disprove thiR hynothpgiR. Half of thp
questionnaire respondents (6/12) agreed that "Minitrials may
require Division management to reject positions taken by District
offices." Two respondent disagreed, one was neutral and three
answered "don't know." Interviews clarified that the
questionnaire responses indicate moderate agreement with the
objective proposition that when a minitrial is conducted with a
Corps Division Commander serving as principal, the CO decision on
the claim may be overturned. Furthermore, some respondents
believe that this is a source of concern for some field staff.
One respondent acknowledged that the minitrial procedure
involves management of the Corps, in effect, overruling their
subordinates. He noted that this process could lead to "some
husbanded ill feelings." However, he said:
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The Division Commander has the command authority, and this
being a military organization, [a person with hurt
feelings will] salute and move on.
However, a former review procedure reportedly caused some
problems. Prior to passage the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, the
Corps used a procedure where District contract dispute decisions
were automatically reviewed by Division personnel. The contractor
was afforded the opportunity to meet with Division staff and the
record was reviewed. As many as 50% of District CO decisions were
overturned at the Division. According to one former District
counsel who also worked as counsel for a Division, the review
process had both positive and negative results. On the one hand,
the review allowed information to surface which had not emerged
at the District bcaiise of narrow persnentives takpn by tonsp
handling the claim. Division review corrected the District
problem of not always being able to "see the forest for the
trees." On the other hand this respondent pointed out that the
results of the review were sometimes perceived as criticism,
albeit informal.
Under the Division review process, there was never any
official criticism. But if I was not pleased [with the
District action] I'd call and ask "how could you let this
thing come up here?" They would say "there was such a
conflict we just couldn't get together..." Calls would go
up and down through the green suit chain, the construction
engineer chain or the attorney chain. We also would get a
chain call up the line "How could you do this? You
understood our position, had all the information and our
feedback..."
Reflecting further on his experience with Division review,
this respondent explained that in his Division there was "little
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reluctance to resolve" an issue differently from the way it had
been handled at the District. When such an action took place,
"the District attorney wouldn't have to hear it third hand."
Rather, Division counsel would call and explain the decision.
However, this respondent had heard of other Divisions showing
reluctance to overturn their colleagues below. He went on to
clarify that the respect for others in the organization is a good
institutional trait of the Corps.
In the Corps there are professionals up and down the line.
Accountants, attorneys, engineers, career military. The
reviewer, albeit at higher organizational level, is not
necessarily of higher professional status. He is not
somebody who is obviously in a superior position. There is
likely a basic equality in academic and professional
credentials. Thus [a review at the Division can lead to]
overturning somebody who is, in most respects, a peer.
Respect and hierarchy are the part of the Corp philosophy.
Its an institutional trait of the organization. You do
support the people below. Its a good institutional trait.
But one that can hinder the organization.
It does seem then, that based on the experience with the
Division review procedure, there is some concern about overruling
of those lower in the organizational structure. That could be a
factor in contract dispute resolution processes though it does
not emerge as an important theme of my interviews. However,
interviews with a sizable and geographically diverse sample of
field personnel might yield more information on this point.
The possibility of overruling of District-level contract
claim decisions by Division-level staff does not now appear to
act as an important constraint on holding ADR processes at the
regional level of the Corps. However, another factor plays a
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larger role in the determination of where ADR settlement should
occur. That is the question of where the relevant organizational
expertise is located.
Resistance to Contract Claim ADR Procedures Which Settle
Cases at the Division
My second assumption regarding relationships within the Corps
pertains more directly to the question of where within the
organization contract dispute should be handled. I expected that
Corps personnel oppose ADR procedures that empower division-level
management to resolve disputes which the personnel believe could
be handled better by District-level employees who are experts in
the subject matter an experienced with contracting procedure.
This assumption was aimed at the minitrial procedure as it
has been conducted by the Corps in the first several cases. The
evidence neither proves nor disproves the expectation.
Respondents were split on the questionnaire assertion that
"Minitrials empower Division-level management to resolve disputes
which District staff are better equipped to handle." Two agreed,
three disagreed, three were neutral and four answered "don't
know."
Those respondents who believed that contract disputes were
better handled in the district felt that typically the District
has more expertise relevant to contract dispute resolution than
the Division. One Corps respondent critical of Division level
minitrials explained that "the institutional knowledge of the
specific dispute is at the District." It is the District
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personnel who observed performance of the contract and they were
the ones to first discuss with the contractor the problems that
ultimately lead to a claim. In contrast, "the Division engineer
and his staff aren't as conversant on the issues." This
respondent saw a practical detriment to the Corps of having a
less qualified person conducting settlement negotiations. In at
least one minitrial
We really got taken. A principal of a large construction
firm against our Division Engineer. The Division Engineer
got completely snookered.
None of my other respondents were as critical about Division
level minitrials. However, several did note that experimentation
with minitrials in the District is a good idea.
The trend in recent minitrials has been to hold the procedure
at the District with the CO or District Engineer as principal.
This is a positive development for several reasons. First, as
noted earlier in this chapter, locating at least some of the
minitrials at the District level expands the pool of principals
appreciably since there 38 Districts, each with several potential
principals, more than three times the number of Divisions. This
reduces the constraint against ADR of limited Division Engineer
management time. Secondly, a District level procedure takes place
closer to the physical location of the disagreement, where the
players and relevant information can be more easily found.
Moreover, encouraging the people who generated the dispute to
resolve it themselves can improve their relationships so that
future conflict will be better handled.
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Corps Deputy Chief Counsel William Robertson agreed that the
District is the place with the salient contract dispute
expertise. He further emphasized that the District is where the
parties to the conflict first set their positions. Robertson, the
second in command of the "legal stovepipe" advocates adapting the
minitrial procedure to the District.
The minitrial at the division is better than the status
quo. But it needs to be adapted to the District level
activities in the Corps. It should have happened in the
District. That is where the positions are established and
the expertise and the people are. There are opportunities
to use it more often.
Robertson sees the trend to District level ADR as a
supplement to the existing Division procedure. He emphasized that
"I'm not saying we should abandon the minitrial at the Division
level."
Another reason to try to settle cases lower in the
organizational structure and earlier in the genesis of the
dispute is that positions may become increasingly solidified as
time goes on. One of my private bar respondents offered an
explanation for the opposition of the Corps district staff to the
Tenn-Tom settlement.
The greatest bias or vested interest is loyalty to what
you do. They had been on one side for the three years the
contract [performance] took. They wanted to win. They were
partisans. They could not [accept] the realistic chance
that they might lose [if the case was taken to the Board.]
Good communication between the contractor and District staff,
during the early days of a dispute may help avoid the positioning
and exaggerated assessment of the strengths of ones case that can
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characterize the partisan litigation process.
Some respondents made points about the attitudes of Corps
personnel who are responsible for negotiating with the
contractor. one said that attitude is the most important aspect
of the contract resolution reform effort. He explained that
Our officers leap to the side of taking a position and
duking it out. The immediate reaction is that the
contractor is trying to rip us off... There is no mechanism
yet to reward another strategy. Its easier to reward a
strident position.
Considering these criticisms of the established contract
dispute system, it is no wonder that contractors so often chose
the formalized procedures rather than invest much time in
informal negotiations.
A member of the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals
suggested that even attorneys deeply involved with contract claim
appeals appreciate the value of trying to settle a claim early.
Unfortunately there doesn't yet appear to be the proper mechanism
to encourage early settlement:
I had a case in Denver last month. I read the papers and
told them "you should not be before this board, you're
arguing primarily about dollar amounts. There is not much
in the way of legal issues. They conferred and settled.
One of the parties thanked me for suggesting they confer
and said "I wish we had done it three years earlier."
Sometimes they need to have somebody in authority give a
push. This helps the lawyers save face. They don't appear
to be backing down. They are not flinching first.
Others say that the the prominence of lawyers in the process
is itself a major part of the problem. They would minimize the
role of lawyers by encouraging the COs to settle more claims and
by using non-lawyers in ADR settlement procedures. This has
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already occurred in at least one case. A contract settlement
between the Corps and the Granite Construction company was
reached last year after a non-binding arbitration procedure where
non-lawyers presented the government and contractor positions on
a differing site condition claim. The neutral advisor prepared a
written recommendation to the District CO and the contractor's
representative. The $1.8 million claim was settled by the
principals for $725,630 (47).
One respondent expressed his views about attorney involvement
in the minitrial in no uncertain terms:
Got to get the lawyers out. [Replace them with]
regulators, planner and engineers. The procedure is too
structured. Get the attorneys out of the loop. That was
done in Mobile [in the Granite Construction case.] The
independent expert heard the presentation by the
engineers. The expert made his recommendation to the
principals.
Given the positive result of the experiment with an ADR
procedure conducted without lawyers and the sentiment that
attorneys are often not helpful, the Corps should continue to
encourage the field offices to try settlement procedures that do
not involve counsel in a leading role. This is not to say that
lawyers should be banned from settlement processes. In fact,
counsel should be trained and supported in making greater non-
judicial settlement efforts. However, lawyers are not needed for
every case. In particular, disputes revolving around technical
disagreements rather than legal distinctions may be best handled
by technical rather than legal experts.
Many respondents recognized that earlier resolution of
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contract disputes, with or without the involvement of attorneys,
would be more efficient and could lead to better resolution. More
settlement at the District level would take better advantage of
the resident expertise and reduce the flow of claims up the
chain. It would free division staff for other functions and allow
the Board of Contract Disputes to hear the cases remaining cases
more expeditiously. Given the'recent criticisms the adversarial
approach to contract claims taken by District personnel, the
question remains: can a higher level of District settlement be
reached?
Part of the answer to that question lies in creating the
climate for problem solving. This in turn would require a higher
degree of objectivity by District staff. The Chief of the
Construction Division of the Corps is confident the "the staff
can be impartial." He explained that the "The COs have a
professionalism and intensity for their work." Still, additional
negotiation training and institutional incentives may be required
to maximize the potential for higher CO resolution of contract
disputes.
Even with all the right conditions, the COs will not be able
to settle all disputes. In fact, there may be an inherent
inconsistency in their dual role as representative of the
government and initial decisionmaker on the validity of contract
claims. Moreover, even with improvements in relations between
complaining contractors and District staff, there will be always
be instances of soured relations. As one former District employee
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put it:
The current process allows people who are most emotionally
involved to handle the dispute [resolution mechanism.] We
need someone to look at it in a new light -- without all
the baggage.
Any new strategy must assume that people involved in disputes
will accumulate "baggage" and that there should be others
available to "look at [the dispute] in a new light."
A District-level minitrial offers the promise of a "fresh
look" procedure at an institutional location close to the place
and the people about which the disagreement pertains. Deputy
Chief Counsel Robertson described how the procedure might be
organized:
The District Engineer can sit as principal as opposed to
the District staff person. The District Engineer is not
involved in the day to day decisions regarding the
contact. Now, typically the staff takes the dispute to the
District Engineer after the positions are set. So the
District Engineer already is in a quasi-judicial status
with his own staff. We can establish the minitrial
procedure at the District with procedural protections to
the parties that would guarantee fairness.
One procedural protection would be for the ADR procedure to
take place prior to the CO decision. One respondent suggested
that would help ensure that the District Commander (i.e. District
Engineer) brings an objective and fair perspective to a district
minitrial.
It will work if the District Commander is away from the
issue. It has to be before the CO decision. Once the
decision has been rendered the District Commander is
brought in. Before that time there may be a value there.
But if the CO denies the claim the contractor has a right
to meet with the Commander to discuss it. The Contractor
may get success at that step but I wouldn't bet on it. The
Commander has his people. The contractor comes in with
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his. Its not a "let's reason together" scene. If the
Commander can have people in who have not been involved
and the contractor can have someone to evaluate his
claim than it might work.
This respondent thought that the potential for the District
minitrial would be enhanced with the involvement of a neutral
advisor as has been the case in most of the Division minitrials,
to date.
I'm very strong on this. You need a neutral advisor. The
neutral advisor can offer objective advice. If you can do
that at the district level it might work. [I emphasize
that] it would be better if the minitrial procedure is
done early. By the time of the CO decision, the District
has bought in. When I wrote Co decisions, when we got to
the point of writing the decision, we had all bought in;
the District Commander, attorney and CO.
The Corps' contract dispute ADR program is moving in the
right direction. After initial experience with Division level
minitrials, they have recently expanded the use to the Districts.
This takes advantage of the ground-level expertise, allows for
settlement earlier in the genesis of the dispute and expands the
opportunity for more frequent use of the procedure. The Division
minitrial has not been abandoned. It is appropriate for certain
cases, such as those the Districts are unable or unwilling to
resolve. The ADR program has also used a non-binding arbitration
procedure which is not studied here. An interesting aspects of
one of the arbitrated cases was that attorneys were not involved.
This allows people with technical and management expertise rather
than legal skills to present the information to the party or
parties judging the case. This approach should be expanded to
include future minitrials.
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While my findings do not demonstrate conclusively whether the
Division-level ADR procedures are encountering widespread
resistance, there are sufficient independent reasons supporting
the Corps' recent use of District-level ADR.
Resistance to Contract Dispute Resolution Due to Oversight
Concerns
Oversight of Corps activities is performed by various
offices, both inside and outside the agency. The Corps of
Engineers has its own oversight and audit offices and is
occasionally investigated by the Department of Defense Inspector
General. Congress is an important source of federal agency
second-guessing, and one to which the Corps is especially
sensitive since the Corps relies on Congress for funding of
specific projects as well as overall agency operations. Finally,
settlement decisions made by the Corps can be subject to review
and criticism from the press and public advocacy groups
(Crowell, 1988).
I assumed that Corps personnel would shy away from ADR
because they would view it as experimental and likely to draw
criticism from oversight bodies. If it is true that Corps
employees, particularly those at the field office level, are
afraid to experiment with ADR, than further initiatives might
better be organized around higher level staff or specific
individuals unconcerned about such criticism. Moreover, if fear
of criticism is a constraint, it may be necessary to address the
causes of the fear or the substance of the oversight critiques.
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As it turns out, I have not found a high degree of concern
about oversight of ADR activities. Oversight does not seem to
constrain ADR in the Corps. Only one ADR settlement has been
reviewed by an oversight office and the resulting report was
generally positive. There is no indication that the press or
Congress has criticized the Corps for its ADR program. To the
contrary, some Congressional representatives are looking to the
Corps as a model for implementing ADR in other agencies (48).
Surprisingly, oversight may impact conventional contract
resolution more than ADR methods. There is evidence that concern
with oversight is actually a cause for the growing docket of
contractor appeals to the COE Board of Contract Appeals. It seems
that in recent years contracting officers have grown fearful of
negotiating settlements with contractors because of the
likelihood of second-guessing by their superiors or others
outside the agency. This finding is pertinent to the question of
where to focus settlement efforts because it indicates that
concern about oversight inhibits COs from resolving many contract
disputes at the District, and encourages contractors to file for
administrative appeal.
Evidence that my expectation regarding oversight as a barrier
to ADR is incorrect includes the questionnaire results. Only four
of the twelve respondents agreed that "the use of ADR may
increase second-guessing of decisions by oversight offices such
as the Department of Defense Inspector General." An equal number
disagreed; one respondent was neutral; and three answered "don't
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know." Follow-up interviews clarified that most respondents felt
that concern with second-guessing is not an important factor in
the attitude of Corps personnel towards ADR. One respondent, who
served as Corps Division counsel for a minitrial indicated that:
Risk of oversight is not a critical barrier to greater use
of ADR. If, however, every time an ADR process took place
there would be another inspection by an investigatory
group, it would have a tremendous negative impact. It
would be devastating if second-guessing [of ADR
resolutions] truly criticized.
Apparently, such criticism has not occurred. The only
investigation of a minitrial settlement was conducted by the
Department of Defense Inspector General in 1986. This review of
the Tenn-Tom settlement found that the process "reasonably
settled" the dispute "in the best interest of the Government."
(49)
The DOD IG report was not without criticism of the Corps
procedure. It disapproved of the lack of documentation of the
bases for the settlement figure. The findings reported that:
Based on the interviews we conducted and a review of the
available "mini-trial" documentation, we believe the
Government had sufficient liability to justify a $17.25
million settlement. The use of the "mini-trial" process,
in this situation, appears to have been valid and in the
best interest of the Government.
We did, however, find a distinct lack of supporting
documentation showing how the $17.25 million settlement
amount was reached and the basis on which it was allocated
to the contractor. We recommend that the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers review its 'mini-trial' procedures with
regard to documenting prenegotiation objectives and
contract settlements."
Chief Counsel indicates that the Corps has been working on
the documentation issue. (50) It is not yet clear whether the
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field offices are documenting their ADR settlements differently
than before the IG report. Indeed, there may not have been a
documentation problem except in the Tenn-Tom case. Chief
Counsel's Office does not have a central file with the various
documents related to each ADR settlement. (51) However, the
results of the IG report are widely known in the Corps and in
government contracting circles. There has been no further IG
criticism.
The IG report concluded with a positive assessment of the
minitrial procedure for contract dispute resolution:
We believe the "mini-trial" procedure, in certain cases,
is an efficient and cost-effective means for settling
contract disputes. The procedure, however, is relatively
new to the military, and we believe its use should be
carefully considered on a case-by-case basis. The
Tennessee-Tom Bigbee claim appears to have been a valid
claim and reasonably settled in the best interest of the
Government.
Notwithstanding the IG's qualified support for minitrials and
strong encouragement from chief counsel's office, there may be
some belief that engaging in minitrial settlement efforts is
risky. Two respondents speculated that field office staff might
be hesitant to experiment with ADR because of the earlier
investigation even though the respondents themselves were not
concerned about oversight. It is difficult to assess whether
there is significant concern on this issue in the filed without
more data from the District and Division offices.
Conventional Settlement Constrained By Oversight Concerns
While not appearing to be a major constraint regarding the
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use of minitrials, concern with oversight may be one of the
reasons that more contract disputes are not settled with
conventional methods by the Cos. The Administrative Conference of
the U.S., in a recent report, identified oversight concern as a
factor in the increased incidence of contract "controversies
remaining unresolved between the parties." (Crowell, 1988, p.9)
The report says that:
Increased oversight by many congressional sources may
discourage contracting officers or their supervisors from
risking close calls, taking on politically sensitive
cases, or handling "hot potatoes." (Ibid.)
The report also asserted that:
The establishment (or expansion) of intra-agency audit
offices and inspectors general, and statutes or rules
enhancing their authority, inhibit settlement of disputes
and limit decisional flexibility. (p9)
Several respondents agreed that Cos and other District
personnel are less willing to settle cases because they fear
second-guessing. Professor Nash describes a situation "where
management seems willing to throw their difficult problems into
the litigation mill rather than work them out at a management
level." (Nash, 1985)
Another respondent believes that fear of second-guessing
provides a partial explanation for the unsatisfactory level of
district contract claim settlement. This respondent is
pessimistic about improvements in the procedure:
Unless a mechanism can be found to provide a reason for
the COs to say "yes," I don't see any way to improve the
situation. We have such a litigious environment out there.
Auditors second-guessing everything...
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While more information is needed, there are indications from
informed observers and Corps staff who formerly worked in the
field offices, that oversight is a constraint on the free
exercise of district level settlement authority. If this
observation is correct, than without a change in either field
office attitudes regarding oversight or changes in actual
oversight activities, it may be difficult to expand settlement
efforts in the field. (52)
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CONCLUSION
Several of my assumptions about the barriers to greater use
of ADR for contract claim settlement are not supported by the
findings. One is tentatively supported by the data. Two are
neither clearly supported nor disproved.
I assumed that Corps personnel are satisfied with established
procedures for resolving contract disputes; they are not. There
is strong dissatisfaction with current procedures. Disagreements
between the Corps and its contractors are often not resolved
expeditiously or efficiently. Backlogs at the Boards of Contract
Appeals are growing and the parties often wait years for the
Board to resolve their disagreements. I expected to find
disappointment with the results of the Corps' early ADR efforts,
but instead, most respondents are satisfied with the results.
They encourage greater use of ADR in the future. Neither
satisfaction with established procedures nor dissatisfaction with
ADR are a barrier to greater use of ADR for contract claims.
I assumed that resource constraints act as a barrier to any
expansion of ADR for contract disputes. This assumption is
tentatively supported by the data. The time of management
personnel is the resource limit that emerged from this research.
Specifically, Division-level minitrials are seen by respondents
as demanding a significant time investment from Division
Engineers who are already fully occupied. However, the trend
towards District-level ADR for contract claims will moot this
concern.
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My assumption that Corps personnel oppose ADR for contract
disputes because they are concerned about the risk of critical
review from oversight offices is not supported by the evidence.
Only one case settled with ADR has been investigated and the
results of that report were generally supportive of the
procedure. There is some evidence, however, that fear of
oversight is important in forming the responses of District
personnel to conventional contract disputes resolution. District
staff may be more likely to deny a potentially controversial
claim because of fear of criticism from oversight offices. This
increases the flow of claims into the administrative and court
review system.
The findings neither support nor disprove my assumption that
Corps personnel oppose ADR procedures which empower Division
management to resolve disputes which could be handled better at
the District Level. There is some support for this assumption but
more information is needed to determine how important it is as a
cause of resistance to ADR. Similarly, the data provide some
support for my expectation that Corps personnel oppose ADR
procedures that result in management overruling decisions of
their subordinates. Though my findings on are not clear, both of
these potential constraints to greater use of ADR for contract
claims seem less important because of the trend towards conducting
ADR procedures in the Districts.
The barriers to ADR are considerably less important than
expected. The Corps' contract claim ADR program seems poised for
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growth. However, minimal barriers are only part of the story of
organizational change. The pressure for change must be sufficient
to overcome institutional inertia and the power of the interest
groups that benefit from the status quo. At present, it is not
clear whether the forces supporting broad adoption of ADR are
powerful enough to make the ADR initiative more than a minor
adjustment in the way the Corps does its business.
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CHAPTER III - FOOTNOTES
(1) My data are drawn from interviews with 18 respondents and
questionnaires completed by 11 of them. See appendix for a list
of respondents. A 12th questionnaire was answered by a respondent
who was not interviewed due to scheduling problems. A total of 14
interviews were conducted with the 18 respondents. 3 interviews
were with more than one respondent. In those cases, the targeted
respondent invited a collegue or two to participate in the
interview.
(2) Respondents said in their questionnaire responses that the
Corps should expand its use of ADR in the following situations
1)disputes with environmental groups (9/12); 2)disagreements over
implementatvon of Local Cost Sharing Agreement for civil works
projects (8/12); 3)COE's responsibility for cleanup of Superfund
sites (8/12) and; 4)the issuance of [environmental regulatory]
permits (7/12). These views indicate support for the Corps
nascent efforts to use ADR in its regulatory program and to
resolve disagreeements that will arise in course of its new
relationship with local sponsors of water resources projects.
(see: Chapter 2, The Corps and Institutional Innovation).
The strongest disagreement with the expanded use of ADR was about
dealing with disagreement within the agency. 3 of 12
questionnaire respondents opposed greater use of ADR for draftin
of particularly controversial internal COE regulations and 5 of
12 oppose ADR for other controversial internal Corps matters such
as reorganization.-Not more than 2 respondents disagreed with the
greater use of ADR by the Corps for any of the other situations
listed.
Regarding each of the questions about expanding Corps use of ADR,
between one and six respondents answered "don't know" or marked
"3" on the agree/disagree scale indicating a "neutral" response.
These anwers are, of course, counted as neither agreement nor
disagreement with the question.
(3) United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
(4) 41 U.S. Code Secs.601-613; 5 U.S.C. Sec.5108(c)(3); 28
U.S.C. Secs.1346(a)(2), 1491(a)(2), 2401(a), 2414, 2510, 2517; 31
U.S.C. Sec.1304(a)(3)(C) (1982).
(5) The term "claim," while not defined by the CDA includes
disagreements about contract performance, such as interpretation
of the terms and equitable adjustments to the contract price as
well as breach of contract. The CDA procedure does not cover bid
protests or the disbarment or suspension of government
contractors.
(6) This dual role may be a cause of differing views about how
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the CO should handle contractor claims.
(7) The Court of Appeals for the Federal District was
established by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub,
L. No. 97-164.
(8) As explained above, the contractor may appeal to the U.S.
Claims Court which is similar in most respects to the BCA except
that the contractor has one year to file the appeal rather than
90 days.
(9) This respondent doesn't outrightly oppose ADR for contract
claims, though he criticizes minitrials conducted at the divison
level of the Corps.
(10) This issue is discussed further in the Findings section
dealing with the appropriate organizational level for dispute
resolution.
(11) The Chief of Construction believes that if the Corps made
the internal commitment to expand the Board, Congress could be
persuaded to appropriate the necessary funds. Other respondents
considered it unrealistic to expect the permanent funding
increase necessary to expand the Board, even if agreement is
reached that expansion of the current mechanism is the solution.
(12) Interview with Ron Kienlin, Deputy Chief Trial Attorney,
U.S. Army.
(13) Contract claims arising from military work such as
construction of an Air Force base are appealed to the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appelas, even if the contract is let
by the Corps of Engineers. The Corps of Engineers Board of
Contract Appels has jurisdiction over civil works contracts for
activites like dredging, or flood control. For either type of
case, the contractor has a second option, the U.S. Claims Court.
(14) One of my COEBCA judge respondents, has instituted what he
considers an ADR procedure. He presides over mandatory settlement
conferences between the parties to all cases assigned to him. In
a different forum, The US Claims Court issued General Order No.
13 on April 17, 1987, establishing a system for voluntary use
of settlement judges and minitrials in which the "ADR judge"
functions as a "neutral advisor." (Nash and Cibinic Report, July,
1987).
(15) Interviews with Wesley Jockisch, Ralph Nash; personal
communication with Peter Adler, Director of the Hawaii Program on
Alternative Dispute Resolution.
(16) Alternative Dispute Resolution Report, BNA, 1/7/88,
6/25/87.
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(17) Interview with Ron Kienlin, Deputy Chief Trial Attorney,
U.S. Army.
(18) Statistics from personal communication with Frank Carr.
(19) ADR Report, 6/25/87.
(20) Ibid.
(21) The oversight issue is further discussed in the section of
this chapter regarding where in the Corps a dispute should be
settled.
(22) Nash & Cibinic Report, February, 1988, p30.
(23) A division review process of CO decisions was abandoned
after it was deemed to be in conflict with the Contract Disputes
Act.
(24) The history of the contract disputes ADR program was
related in a personal communication with Sabrina Simon.
(25) The minitrial procedure was created in 1977 to resolve a
complex patent infringement case between Telecredit and TRW and
ha b increasingly used since then, particularly by large
companies in conflict with parties with whom they have ongoing
commercial relationships. (ABA Report, 1986).
(26) Several of the lawyers attending this meeting were among the
first in the field offices to use the new ADR procedures.
(27) Corps Circular, September 23, 1985.
(28) Ibid.
(29) The creators of the procedure called it an "information
exchange," but a New York Times headline writer in August 1978
found "mini-trial" to be more descriptive of the TRW/Telecrdit
settlement process and the name stuck. (Harter, 1986).
(30) Nash & Cibinic Report, February, 1987 p31-34.
(31) Ibid.
(32) Ibid.
(33) Typical of the nonbinding arbitration cases was the
Grantite Construction Co. dispute, settled in March, 1987. Non-
lawyers presented the government's and the contractor's positions
on a $1.8 million "delay" claim to a arbitrator who was also not
an attorney but who had substantial technical expertise. Like the
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minitrial procedure, each party made an informal presentation of
the facts and its position. The arbitrator prepared a written
report which was presented to the two principals. The arbitrator
also made an oral report to the explaining his findings and
recommendations. Within a day, the principals negotiated a
$725,630 settlement in accordance with the arbitrator's
recommendation. (Corps Memo, March 30, 1987) For more information
about the Corps' use of non-binding arbitration and Disputes
Resolution Panel see Carr, 1988).
(34) See ACUS Sourcebook.
(35) Information for this case description is drawn from several
sources: Department of the Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Memorandum on Alternative Dispute Resolution Update (November 25,
1987); Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense,
"Tennessee-Tom Bigbee Claim Settlement" (Report of investigation,
July 29, 1986); "Drop in Minitrials Analyzed at ABA Meeting," 46
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 352 (Aug. 25, 1986); Phillip Harter,
"Points on a Continuum..." 1986; Carr, 1988; Edelman and Carr,
1987; Comment of Eldon Crowell, Lester Edelman, James Henry, Jack
Lemley, Ralph Nash, and Derek Vander Schaaf in "Applying
Alternative Dispute Resoluton to Contract Claims," Ad Law
Journal, Fall, 1987; and interviews with Ralph Nash, Jack Lemley,
Wesley Jockisch, Stanfield Johnson, Sabrina Simon, Frank Carr,
Lester Edelman, Richard Solibakke and Richard Hanson-
(36) The joint venture was composed of three companies:
Morrison-Knudsen, Brown & Root and Martin K. Eby, Inc.
(37) Rule 12 requires the Board to ghear claims below the
$50,000 threshhold within 90 days of filing.
(38) Corps Engineering Circular No. 27-1-3, (September 23,
1985).
(39) The minitrial policy was not intended to be a mandatory
procedure. The field offices were encouraged to adapt the the
minitrial to their own situation (interview with Frank Carr,
1988). In fact, four of the minitrials conducted since January
1987 have been held at the District level rather than at the
Division as originally recommended.
(40) One respondent suggested that the perception that a new
procedure will increase demands on Corps personnel may be an
important contstraint even if there is no real increase in
responsibilities. This respondent pointed out that anything new
encounters some resistence in the organization simply because of
the fear that it will add new tasks.
(41) Corps of Engineers Federal Aquisitions Regulation --
Supplement.
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(42) Expanding the pool of principals beyond the Division
Engineer and District Engineer may be complicated by the
traditional partition of agency responsibilities between military
and civilian employees. While 95% of Corps personnel are
civilian, the command positions in each Division and District are
held by military officers.
(43) The Chief Counsel's office does not compile statistics on
how many claims are settled by what procedure at which level of
the organization.
(44) Nash &Cibinic Report, February 1988.
(45) This hypothetical is based on an account of a typical
contract dispute conveyed to me by Sabrina Simon.
(46) Interview with Judge Wesley Jockisch.
(47) Department of the Army, memo, November 25, 1988.
(48) Interview with Jerome Delli Priscoli, 1988.
(49) DOD IG Report, July 29, 1986.
(50) Administrative Law Journal, Fall 1987 p.573.
(51) Interview with Sabrina Simon.
(52) This research was not designed to examine the effect of
oversight on conventional contract settlement. Consequently not
enough data was gathered to make definitive conclusions on this
point.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Corps of Engineers has pioneered the use of
minitrials and non-binding arbitration in federal contract claim
settlement. They experimented successfully with environmental
dispute resolution and corsensus-building with historically
estranged groups. In civil works projects, the Corps incorporated
dispute resolution techniques into cost sharing agreements with
sponsors of local projects. Indeed the Corps is on the verge of
implementing a comprehensive alternative dispute resolution
program. Such a move is consistent with the agency's past
response, to public criticism regarding the need for greater
public participation and increased environmental awareness. These
are the first important steps towards addressing criticisms of
the Corps' methods for handling disputes; and more opportunities
exist.
I offer a series of recommendations focusing on possible
improvements in the contract claims settlement, environmental
regulatory disputes resolution and negotiated relations with
local sponsors of civil works projects.
EXPAND CONTRACT CLAIMS ADR EXPERIMENT
The Corps' contract settlement initiative was launched in
1984 to address dissatisfaction with procedures for handling
disagreements with contractors. The dissatisfaction was directed
towards the contract claim system which is used by most federal
agencies. The Administrative Conference of the United States has
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studied the federal contract claims system and concluded that
"[m]ost knowledgeable government officials, contractors and
attorneys agree that government contract appeals have become too
onerous, too expensive and too time-consuming." (ADR Report,
January 7, 1988) My findings corroborate this conclusion
regarding the Corps. The Administrative Conference supports ADR
for government contract dispute resolution and in December, 1987,
adopted recommendations to expand the use of ADR to settle
government procurement litigation. Several of their
recommendations are directed to Congress, the President and the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy and are beyond the scope of
this report. Others, addressed to federal agencies, apply
directly to the Corps. Some of the,following recommendations
overlap with the ACUS recommendations; others are distinct.
The contract claims system established by the Contract
Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA) is not operating efficiently. A
constant stream of appeals and judicialized procedures at the
Boards of Contract Appeals is causing an ever-increasing backlog.
The contract disputants commonly must wait two or more years for
a decision. Litigation costs are high for the government and the
contractors. An adversarial nature climate is typical of the
conventional contract claim system and begins at the District
level of the Corps where early positioning and an unwillingness
to compromise are all too common. The dispute, even when about
technical rather than legal matters, is lest to attorneys who
argue the positions to a judge rather than negotiating an
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effective resolution of the issues between technically expert
management officials.
The Corps' contract claims ADR program addresses these
problems. The minitrial and non-binding arbitration procedures
place the conflict in the hands of representatives of the
disputants who are generally better qualified to determine an
appropriate resolution than the judges and lawyers. A neutral
advisor can assist the principals in accurately assessing the
issues and in focusing on the essential matters of the dispute.
ADR procedures can bring about quicker resolution. When held at
the District level of the Corps, ADR allows the conflict to be
settled close to the people and place where the disagreement
arose. This leads to quicker and mora efficient settlement of
contract disputes.
Build a Contract Claims ADR Database
Currently, the results of ADR cases are reported informally
to an attorney in the Chief Counsel's office. Periodically, a
brief summary of cases is given to the Chief and to others in and
outside the Corps. One early case which was the subject of a
Department of Defense Inspector General's report has been
analyzed in detail. Another is the subject of an article by one
the Corps attorneys involved with the case (Page, 1987). Other
than these two references there is no systematic collection and
analysis of information about minitrials or non-binding
arbitration. Headquarters staff and field personnel would benefit
131
from more information about the actual cases. In particular, the
Corps should collect more information regarding the ADR
procedures used; the attitudes of the participants before, during
and after the procedure; the criticisms from others involved with
the case; and comparisons between cases settled with ADR and
those resolved with conventional processes.
I recommend that Chief Counsel's Office create a data base of
all contract cases in which ADR procedures were applied. The data
should include detailed information regarding the nature and
history of the dispute; the settlement procedures used and the
reasons those procedures were chosen; the results of the process;
the attitudes and satisfaction of the participants; and
recommendations of the participants for improving the process. If
the number of ADR cases grows substantially, this data base can
be computerized for easy access and statistical analysis.
Corps staff involved with the case can collect and record
much of this information. However, an objective assessment is
also needed. An independent office in the Corps or consultants
should be assigned the responsibility of interviewing the parties
to the dispute and others involved with the case. To encourage
forthright criticism, interviews should be conducted on a
confidential basis. The independent analysts should compile the
results of their research and offer their own assessment of the
strengths and weaknesses of the procedures used.
The information available indicates that the minitrial
experiment of the Corps has been successful. The 9 claims
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resolved under the program were settled earlier than they would
have been without the ADR procedure. Money was saved. However,
speed of resolution and transaction costs are only two measures
of the efficacy of the ADR mechanisms. Other measures include:
satisfaction of the parties; effect of the process on the future
relations between the parties and between the Corps and other
contractors not party to the settled disputes; the wisdom of the
settlement terms relative to the likely BCA or U.S. Claims Court
decision; the precedential effect of the settlements, and the
impact of the settlement approach and the terms of the settlement
on the employees of the Corps and the settling contractors.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that minitrials are a very useful
supplement to conventional contract disputes settlement. However,
detailed examination and analysis is needed to assess the quality
of the settlements reached through ADR as compared to claims
resolved with conventional procedures.
Information collected in a central contract ADR database
would not only assist OCE (headquarters) policymakers in
modifying the use of ADR for contract claims, but would also
provide useful information for Division and District staff
considering ADR experiments. The data should be shared with other
government agencies which already look to the Corps' ADR
leadership for contract claims settlement innovations.
In the absence of better information about the Corps'
experience with ADR procedures, the initiative is proceeding on
the basis of impressions that that ADR is an improvement over the
133
conventional system. The strongest supporters, predictably, are
those who have been involved in developing and implementing the
program. While critics of the ADR initiative are not prominent,
the field offices have yet to embrace the new techniques. A
systematic collection of more information about how ADR is
working, including criticisms, could ground its supporters in
verifiable data and empower them to respond to critics with more
than mere anecdotal evidence. Moreover, more complete information
would contribute a wise evolution of the procedures. For example,
since all agree that the conventional system will be retained,
the Corps needs to more clearly identify the characteristics of
cases that should be channeled into each available dispute
resolution procedure.
Headquarters also needs to better understand the nature and
extent of resistance to ADR in the field offices. This report
finds that some of the purported attitudinal barriers are not as
great as anticipated. However, these conclusions are based
primarily on interviews with headquarters staff. More research
should be conducted to ascertain the attitudes of field personnel
at the District and Division levels. Given the independence and
distribution of the offices, I recommend a large sample drawn
from a broad cross-section of offices.
Encourage Innovation - Keep the Procedures Flexible
One of the strengths of the Corps' contract claims ADR
program is the flexibility with which it has developed. Chief
Counsel has encouraged the field offices to experiment with ADR
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and allows them to structure the procedures according to their
own needs. The continuation of field office discretion as to
whether to use ADR, and the opportunity for Districts and
Divisions to formulate their own procedures may lead to greater
use of ADR than if a strict structure is applied. Moreover,
varying the process provides a larger data base of procedural
options and their respective degrees of effectiveness.
All respondents agreed that the procedures should not be
overformalized. Several mentioned the proclivity of government
agencies to place too much structure on new activities. If the
Corps were to write regulations that required a specified and
detailed contract claims settlement process, the parties would
lose the advantage of being able to maid the process to their own
needs. For example, the parties in one case may want the neutral
advisor to convene and facilitate the minitrial and subsequent
settlement negotiations. Another set of principals may prefer the
advisor to play a more passive role, allowing the principals to
run the proceedings with the advisor sharing his or her views
only when requested. In a third dispute, the principals may
decide that no advisor is needed because the disagreement is
straightforward and there are no communication problems between
the parties.
Encourage Greater Use of ADR in the Divisions and Districts
The Corps needs more experience with ADR to assess its value
as a supplement to conventional contract claim resolution
135
procedures. While a voluntary approach seems appropriate,
particularly at this early stage, headquarters should consider
setting goals for greater use of the new procedures.
I recommend that the Corps continue to experiment with ADR
for contract claims by encouraging all divisions and districts to
try the procedures. Specifically, more minitrials should be
conducted in the District offices. This approach has the
advantage of keeping settlement discussions closer to where the
differences arose. The district personnel hold more expertise
regarding the circumstances and personalities of a particular
case and are experienced in contract issues and settlement, in
general. A further advantage of District level ADR is that it
removes a constraint to greater use of the ADR at the Division
level, namely that Division management may not have the time to
conduct many minitrials.
A District level contract ADR initiative could be an element
of a larger effort to improve dispute settlement rates at the
District both before and after contracting officers make final
decisions on claims. The Administrative Conference made such a
recommendation. They suggested that "[a]gencies should tailor the
ranks of principals to suit the magnitude of the case and
encourage use of ADR earlier in the case (e.g., at the CO level)"
The ACUS also recommended that federal regulations be amended to
"encourage COs, before issuing a decision likely to be
unacceptable to a claimant, to recommend to the parties and their
representatives that they seek to explore the use of ADR to
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resolve their differences."
I recommend that Corps headquarters set specific objectives
for greater use of contract ADR in the coming period. To achieve
a broader agency experience with ADR, Corps leadership should
consider encouraging each division and each district to conduct
at least one ADR settlement effort within a year.
Encourage Increased Sharing of Contract ADR Experience
More experience with ADR and the development of an accessible
database will improve the Corps knowledge of the advantages and
disadvantages of ADR. But, written data does not provide the
whole story. Neither can it directly build consensus within the
agency as to the proper way to proceed. Face-to-face discussions
can serve those functions. .- ,
I recommend that Chief Counsel's office convene a contracts
dispute resolution conference in the near future. Division and
District engineers, their counsel and a select group of COs
should meet to discuss their experience and concerns regarding
contract ADR and contract disputes in general. Such a conference
would allow the field leadership who are skeptical about the new
procedures to hear the experience of those who have tried it.
Frank discussions would further educate headquarters about the
barriers to greater use of ADR. Various contract settlement
policy options should be explored in the conference. Headquarters
could experiment by making the conference itself a consensus-
building experiment. This would provide headquarters and field
office personnel with valuable first-hand experience with a
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consensus-building technique they might apply to various sorts of
conflict resolution. If successful, this kind of gathering could
be held annually. Moreover, division engineers may chose to hold
meetings in their regions with a similar agenda, perhaps also
including negotiation and dispute resolution skills building
exercises.
EXPAND 404 PERMIT NEGOTIATION EXPERIMENT
The Army Corps of Engineers has had a positive experience
with negotiating Clean Water Act Section 404 general permits
(Priscoli, 1988; Rosener, 1981). (1) Notwithstanding the
positive appraisal by participants and observers, and
headquarters guidance encouraging greater use of ADR for
regulatory permit negotiations, the experience seems to be
limited to the Sanibel and Vicksburg cases. Yet, the potential
in this area is enormous, particularly if individual as well as
general permits are considered in the pool of possible cases for
ADR. The Corps processes some 14,000 regulatory permits annually
(Hall, 1983). Some 97% of permit requests are granted (OTA
Wetlands Report, 1984). About a third are modified before
issuance including required mitigation measures. Permits are
issued more quickly since regulatory reform of the early 1980s
but respondents indicate that the burden of this program on the
Corps is growing. (2,3) Moreover, problems are not necessarily
settled with permit issuance. Disgruntled parties may continue
their battles in other arenas.
138
While the average processing time for individual permits is
down, controversial permit decisions take much longer. According
to the Radford Hall, Chief of the Permits Section of the San
Francisco District, about one third of permit applications are
controversial (Hall, 1986). While there is no precise definition
of "controversial," Hall finds that most fall in this category
because of objections to the application submitted in response to
public notices on the proposed action. The most controversial
applications may require an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
which can add a year or more of additional processing time (some
applications take three years or more - Hall, 1986).
Controversial permit applications often bring into conflict
the Corps, other federal and state agencies, the applicant, and
environmental advocacy groups. The Office of Technology
Assessment reports that some Corps Districts exhibit a mediation
style to handling such contention.
Some districts play an active role as mediator in disputes
between applicants and resource agencies with wetland-
protection concerns. Resource agencies are positive about
this approach in districts where it is used. Although it
can be time-consuming, there is general agreement by the
agencies that better decisions and better working
relationships have resulted. In fact, one Corps regulatory
chief commented to OTA that regulatory reform measures
that limit the time available for this kind of
decisionmaking may result in more permits being denied.
Other districts suggested these time limits would result
in more "rubber-stamp" approvals of permit applications
(OTA Wetlands Report, 1984).
When the Corps adopts a passive role instead, the applicant
is directed to work out the objections of agencies and advocacy
groups on their own. In these cases, OTA found that applicants
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face problems of conflicting recommendations from different
agencies. They also have difficulty finalizing agreements. The
results of meetings between objecting agencies and permit
applicants are often interpreted differently, especially if the
agency making the ultimate decision is not present to verify
compromises or changed permit conditions (OTA Wetlands Report,
1984).
These problems may be addressed with a consensus based permit
decision process such as recently conducted by the Vicksburg
District for a general permit. If all the relevant agencies, and
likely opponents to the application agree to the permit
conditions, subsequent disagreements are less likely. The
consensus building process may also be applicable to
controversial individual permit decisions.
I found less agreement regarding the value of ADR for
environmental regulation than in the contract disputes area. All
of my respondents who commented on the subject support more use
of ADR for negotiating general permits though one key policymaker
believes that the public shouldn't necessarily be involved in
such negotiations (just the applicant and the interested
agencies). Views are spilt as to whether ADR is appropriate for
individual permit decisions. Obviously, these opinions are based
on limited experience.
I recommend that the Corps experiment further with ADR and
assess the appropriateness of dispute resolution procedures for
the environmental regulatory program. Specifically, the Corps
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should begin a Regulatory Dispute Resolution pilot program.
Encourage the field offices to identify appropriate regional
disputes for general permit negotiations and controversial
individual permits for site-specific permit negotiations. One
criterion would be the likelihood that a permit would be
particularly controversial. Another, that all affected parties
are willing to negotiate. Further guidance from headquarters is
needed to assist the divisions and districts in determining which
cases are appropriate. This headquarters support should include
detailed criteria for identifying disputes appropriate for ADR
and technical support to carry out dispute resolution activities.
The Corps may not yet have the capacity to carry out
environmental regulatory dispute resolution on a large scale. On
the other hand, the organization's nearly 20 years of experience
with an active civil works public participation program can be
applied to this area of conflict. In the last decade and a half,
hundreds of environmental controversies have been handled with
ADR techniques. (4) The regulatory dispute resolution pilot
project should include neutrals experienced in environmental
dispute resolution and knowledgeable about the structure and
culture of the Corps. Internal resources should also be
identified. The Institute for Water Resources and the Corps'
training center in Huntsville should play a prominent role in
providing in-house conflict resolution training.
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PREPARE TO IMPLEMENT LCA'S WITH TRAINING AND BROADER
PARTICIPATION
Water resource projects are a common source conflict for the
Corp. Indeed, the Corps' public participation program was a
response to complaints that important interests were excluded
from the planning and implementation of these civil works
projects. Contention continues regarding new projects,
notwithstanding the Corps' greater sensitivity to environmental
concerns. The agency was wise to anticipate problems with local
sponsors by incorporating the ADR clause in the Local Cost
Sharing Agreements. I recommend that the Corps take ADR an extra
step and include representatives of other interests in any water
resources dispute resolution efforts. This already occurs to some
extent with the existing public participation program. (5) The
public is invited to comment on proposed civil works projects and
participate in hearings designed to gather their views. However,
these efforts typically do not include sharing of decisionmaking
authority with member of the public.
This report does not include data documenting problems caused
by the limited extent of public participation in the Corps' water
resource mission. Instead, the author recommends an experiment
with broader public participation as an opportunity to extend the
Corps' laudable goal of collaboration with governmental sponsors
to include consensus building with other non-governmental
interests. I recommend, then, that the Corps identify a group of
new water resource projects where the local sponsor is also
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interested in a bold public participation experiment. For those
projects, the Corps and the local sponsor would hold conduct a
consensus-building process similar to the one used in the
Vicksburg general permit negotiation. If a consensus agreement is
reached on how to proceed with the project, the LCA could include
a provision for continued participation of the non-governmental
representatives alongside the Corps and local sponsor. This
effort, if successful, might result in a better relations and
closer cooperation within the sponsoring community and between
the community and the Corps. The likelihood of litigation or
other project delaying tactics would be reduced and the image of
the Corps would be enhanced.
Regardless of the scope of participation that the Corps
chooses for its future water resources projects, the agency
should carefully consider its negotiations strategies. This
research has not found evidence of problems in the negotiations
conducted to date. However, interviews revealed that there is not
a consistent approach to negotiating the LCAs. The agreements
negotiated thus far have been supervised by headquarters. The
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works has signed all
the agreements although future agreements may be negotiated by
the Corps' field office with independence. Before the field
offices are granted more independent authority, the agency should
clarify for the negotiators where they .will have negotiating
flexibility and where there is no room for compromise.
Furthermore, the agency should consider developing a training
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course specifically for the agency representatives who will be
negotiating the LCAs.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IV
(1) A senior analyst at the Corps' Institute for Water Resources
explained that there is no system for collecting information
about general permit negotiations. There may be other cases where
negotiations with all interest groups has led to a general permit
based on consensus recommendations. It seems there is a need for
more complete information regarding field activities in
environmental regulation as well as contract dispute resolution.
(2) Interview with Bernie Goode.
(3) The average processing time for Corps permits has dropped
from over 140 days in 1981 to 70 days in 1984 (Hall, 1986).
(4) See Susskind, Bacow and Wheeler, 1983, for seven documented
cases of environmental regulatory negotiation; also see Bingham,
1986, for documented examples of 161 cases of environmental
dispute resolution.
(5) Interview with Jerome Delli Priscoli.
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MIT QUESTIONNAIRE
INSTRUCTIONS:
CIRCLE ONE
1
Strongly
Ag ree
2 3 4 5
Strongly
Disagree
ADR techniques are a useful supplement to
traditional methods of resolving disputes. 1 2 3 4 5
The Corps should use ADR more often. 1 2 3 4 5
In particular, the Corps should expand its use of ADR in the following
situations:
o contract claims (e.g. contract
interpretation, differing site
condition) 1 2 3 4 5
o disagreements over implementation of Local
Cost Sharing Agreemeints for civil wurks
projects 1 2 3 4 5
o disagreements over cost-shared feasibility
studies for civil works projects 1 2 3 4 5
o drafting of particularly controversial
external regulations 1 2 3 4 5
o drafting of particularly controversial
internal COE regulations 1 2 3 4 5
o other controversial internal Corps
matters (e.g. reorganization) 1 2 3 4 5
o disputes about civil works
operations and maintenance 1 2 3 4 5
o disputes about COE real estate activities
(e.g. acquisitions, sales) 1 2 3 4 5
o COE's responsibility for cleanup of
Superfund sites 1 2 3 4 5
o the issuance of civil works program permits 1 2 3 4 5
o other disputes with environmental groups 1 2 3 4 5
o disputes related to the MILCON program 1 2 3 4 5
d.k.
Don't
Know
d.k.
d.k.
d.k.
d.k.
d.k.
d. k.
d.k.
d. k.
d.k.
d.k.
d. k.
d.k.
d.k.
d.k.
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Page Two
CIRCLE ONE
2 3 4 5
Strongly
Disagree
d.k.
Don't
Know
The use of ADR may increase second guessing of
decisions by oversight offices such as the
Department of Defense Inspector General.
ADR is unnecessary because current Corps
mechanisms for handling disputes are
satisfactory.
Corps personnel are opposed to greater
use of ADR because of the disappointing
results, to date.
ADR increases the workload for management
and staff.
ADR procedures tend to be too formal,
they reduce flexibility in handling
conflicts with outside parties.
Greater use of ADR in the Corps may
increase overall Corps efficiency.
Corps personnel should be provided more
information about ADR so that they will
be better able to decide when and how to
use ADR procedures.
There are legal constraints to greater
use of ADR in the Corps.
Mini-trials may require division management to
reject positions taken by district offices.
Mini-trials, empower division-level management
to resolve disputes which district staff
are better equipped to handle.
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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1
Strongly
Ag ree
d.k.
d.k.
d.k.
d.k.
d . k-.
d.k.
d.k.
d.k.
d.k.
d.k.
MIT Questionnaire
Page Three
OTHER QUESTIONS
How many years have you worked at the Corps?
What is your job title?
What is your educational background?
What previous employment have you had, outside the COE?
Briefly outline your responsibilities in the Corps.
What other positions have you held in the Corps?
How would you rate your experience with ADR?
How would you rate your knowledge of ADR?
1 2
extensive
1 2
extensive
3 4 5
none
3 4 5
none
Your Comments:
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